1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3	SAN JOSE DIVISION
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5	THE EAGEROOK ING AND \ C 07 01200 IN
6	THE FACEBOOK, INC. AND) C-07-01389 JW MARK ZUCKERBERG,)
7) SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA PLAINTIFFS,)
8) AUGUST 6, 2008 VS.
9) PAGES 1-73 CONNECTU, INC. (FORMERLY)
10	KNOWN AS CONNECTU, LLC),) PACIFIC NORTHWEST)
11	SOFTWARE, INC., WINSTON) WILLIAMS, AND WAYNE)
12	CHANG,))
13	DEFENDANT.)
14	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES WARE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16	UNITED STATES DISTRICT CODGE
17	APPEARANCES:
18	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE BY: I. NEEL CHATTERJEE,
19	MONTE M.F. COOPER, AND YVONNE GREET
20	1000 MARSH ROAD MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA 94025
21	MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA 94025
22	APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
23	
24	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: LEE-ANNE SHORTRIDGE, CSR, CRR CERTIFICATE NUMBER 9595
25	CERTIFICATE NOMBER 9393
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2	APPEARANCES (CONTIN	UED)
3	FOR THE DEFENDANT:	BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP BY: D. MICHAEL UNDERHILL
4		5301 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20015
5		WILDITENCTON, D.C. 20013
6	FOR INTERVENOR:	O'SHEA PARTNERS, LLP BY: SEAN F. O'SHEA AND
7		MARK A. WEISSMAN 90 PARK AVENUE, 20TH FLOOR
8		NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016
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	1	SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA AUGUST 6, 2008
	2	PROCEEDINGS
	3	(WHEREUPON, COURT CONVENED AND THE
16:44:12	4	FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD:)
16:44:12	5	THE CLERK: CALLING CASE NUMBER 07-01389,
16:44:27	6	THE FACEBOOK, INC., VERSUS CONNECTU, INC., ET AL,
16:44:27	7	ON FOR NON-PARTIES' MOTION TO INTERVENE, AND
16:44:34	8	DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
16:44:35	9	PENDING APPEAL.
16:44:36	10	COUNSEL, PLEASE COME FORWARD AND STATE
16:44:39	11	YOUR APPEARANCES.
16:44:40	12	MR. O'SHEA: YOUR HONOR, SEAN O'SHEA AND
16:44:42	13	MIKE WEISSMAN FOR APPLICANT INTERVENORS.
16:44:45	14	MR. UNDERHILL: YOUR HONOR, MICHAEL
16:44:47	15	UNDERHILL FOR CONNECTU, THE DEFENDANT.
16:44:50	16	MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, NEEL
16:44:51	17	CHATTERJEE FOR MARK ZUCKERBERG AND FACEBOOK.
16:44:55	18	AND WITH ME IS MONTE COOPER AND YVONNE
16:44:59	19	GREER.
16:44:59	20	MR. FISHER: AND GEORGE FISHER.
16:45:01	21	THE COURT: I'M SORRY. I DID NOT GET
16:45:02	22	YOUR APPEARANCE, PLEASE. YOU'RE NEW TO THIS, SO
16:45:04	23	CAN YOU GIVE ME YOUR NAME AGAIN?
16:45:06	24	MR. O'SHEA: YES, YOUR HONOR, SEAN
16:45:09	25	O'SHEA.

16:45:10	1	THE COURT: MR. O'SHEA.
16:45:10	2	MR. O'SHEA: AND I'M HERE WITH MARK
16:45:12	3	WEISSMAN.
16:45:12	4	THE COURT: MR. WEISSMAN.
16:45:15	5	I HAVE TWO MATTERS, MAYBE MORE, BUT I HAD
16:45:17	6	TWO THAT I HAD INTENDED TO GIVE YOU SOME TIME TO
16:45:21	7	ADDRESS.
16:45:23	8	THE FIRST IS THIS MOTION TO INTERVENE,
16:45:26	9	AND THEN THE SECOND IS A MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION
16:45:29	10	OF THE JUDGMENT.
16:45:32	11	PERHAPS IT WOULD FORESHORTEN YOUR
16:45:36	12	ARGUMENT IF I COMMENT ON THIS FIRST MOTION AND TELL
16:45:39	13	YOU WHAT I HAVE AS AN INTENDED DECISION.
16:45:45	14	IT DOES SEEM PLEASE BE SEATED.
16:45:48	15	IT DOES SEEM TO THE COURT THAT THIS IS A
16:45:54	16	CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE THE TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO SEEK TO
16:45:56	17	INTERVENE IN THE CASE ARE IDENTIFIED IN INTEREST
16:46:03	18	SUFFICIENTLY WITH CONNECTU THAT THE COURT IS
16:46:07	19	DISPOSED TO ALLOW THEM TO INTERVENE IN THE LAWSUIT.
16:46:12	20	I HAVEN'T DONE THE INDEPENDENT LOOK THAT
16:46:14	21	I WOULD OTHERWISE WANT TO DO, BUT MY STAFF ADVISES
16:46:20	22	ME THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE PREVIOUSLY BEFORE
16:46:24	23	THE COURT IN THIS ACTION AND SOUGHT TO BE DISMISSED
16:46:32	24	FROM THE ACTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE COURT
16:46:34	25	LACKED PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THEM.

1 16:46:36 16:46:39 2 16:46:44 3 16:46:46 4 16:46:50 5 16:46:53 6 16:46:57 7 16:47:03 8 16:47:08 9 16:47:10 10 16:47:12 11 16:47:15 12 16:47:18 13 16:47:20 14 16:47:23 15 16:47:26 16 16:47:29 17 16:47:34 18 16:47:42 19 16:47:49 20 16:47:52 21 16:47:57 22 16:48:00 23 16:48:03 24

16:48:07 25

I HAVEN'T LOOKED TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT
THEY ARE LITIGANTS BEFORE THE OTHER CASE THAT WAS
PENDING BETWEEN THESE PARTIES WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN
THE SETTLEMENT THAT THEY REACHED.

BUT IT CERTAINLY IS CLEAR TO THE COURT
THAT THEY HAVE A SUFFICIENT INTEREST IN THIS MATTER
THAT THEY SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS PARTIES TO THE
EXTENT THAT THEIR INTEREST MIGHT BE AFFECTED BY THE
CONDUCT OF THE COURT.

AND SO THAT WOULD BE THE FIRST THING I'D WISH TO HAVE ARGUED IS WHETHER OR NOT THERE'S A REASON TO NOT PERMIT THEM TO INTERVENE.

FOR ME, QUITE FRANKLY, THOUGH, THE MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER OR NOT THEY SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO INTERVENE FOR ALL PURPOSES AND TO FILE THE PROFFERED COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION.

THE COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION SEEKS TO

PLEAD A CLAIM THAT IS -- THAT HAS -- THAT IS

PARALLEL TO THE CASE THAT, IN THE COURT'S VIEW, IS

SUBSUMED BY THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE, AND IN THE

COURT'S VIEW SEEKS TO REOPEN, FOR LITIGATION

AGAINST -- I'M NOT SURE WHO THE DEFENDANT IN

INTERVENTION IS. IT SEEMS THAT THAT'S UNCLEAR TO

ME -- BUT SEEKS TO REOPEN INTO LITIGATION IN A NEW

PLEADING WITH NUANCES AND DISCOVERY AND PRESUMABLY

TRIALS, MATTERS THAT ARE -- OR AS THE COURT IS 16:48:11 1 CONCERNED, COVERED BY THE JUDGMENT. 16:48:15 2 AND SO IT IS MY INTENTION TO GRANT THE 16:48:17 3 MOTION TO INTERVENE, BUT TO ALLOW THE INTERVENTION 16:48:22 4 FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPEAL AND FOR PURPOSES OF ANY 16:48:26 5 POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS, SO THAT IF IT -- IF THE 16:48:32 6 16:48:39 7 CASE PROCEEDS ON APPEAL TO THE POINT WHERE IT'S REMANDED BACK TO THIS COURT FOR FURTHER 16:48:42 8 16:48:44 9 PROCEEDINGS, THEY WOULD BE PARTIES FOR THOSE

MATTERS THAT COME BEFORE THIS COURT THAT ARE STILL

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, AND THERE MAY BE POST-JUDGMENT

WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT WHILE THE CASE

IS ON APPEAL.

16:48:46 10

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16:49:02 15

16:49:04 16

16:49:07 17

16:49:08 18

16:49:11 19

16:49:14 20

16:49:16 21

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16:49:24 23

16:49:29 24

16:49:31 25

I'VE BEEN ADVISED THAT THERE'S AN APPEAL. AGAIN, I HAVEN'T SEEN THE NOTICE OF THE APPEAL AND I HAVEN'T -- I'VE NOT INFORMED MYSELF FURTHER WITH RESPECT TO THAT.

SO THAT'S THE OTHER INTENT THAT I WANT TO DISCLOSE IS AN INTENT TO PERMIT INTERVENTION, BUT FOR A LIMITED PURPOSE.

THE QUESTION THAT I ASKED MYSELF, THOUGH, IN THIS UNUSUAL PROCESS IS, WHAT IS -- WHAT PROCEDURAL DEVICE DOES THE COURT NEED TO USE TO RECOGNIZE INTERVENTION FOR THIS LIMITED PURPOSE? HOW DO I RECOGNIZE IT?

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1 16:49:33 16:49:36 2 16:49:41 3 16:49:44 4 16:49:48 5 16:49:51 6 16:49:54 7 16:49:56 8 16:49:58 9 16:50:01 10 16:50:06 11 16:50:07 12 16:50:09 13 16:50:11 14 16:50:15 15 16:50:15 16 16:50:17 17 16:50:20 18 16:50:22 19 16:50:28 20 16:50:31 21 16:50:34 22 16:50:36 23 16:50:38 24

16:50:40 25

THERE'S NO COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION THAT
DOES IT. IT SIMPLY SEEMS TO BE AN ORDER PERMITTING
THAT INTERVENTION WITH THE IDEA THAT IF THE CASE
RETURNS TO A LITIGATED STATUS, THEN I NEED TO SORT
OUT WHETHER THEY ARE INTERVENING AS PLAINTIFFS OR
DEFENDANTS AND WHO ARE THE PARTIES AGAINST WHOM
THEY WOULD BE PURSUING THEIR CLAIMS.

LET ME PAUSE WITH THOSE INTRODUCTORY

COMMENTS AND INVITE MR. O'SHEA OR OTHERS TO COMMENT

ON THE COURT'S INTENDED DECISION.

MR. O'SHEA: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

FIRST OF ALL, JUDGE, THANK YOU FOR
HEARING US ON SHORT NOTICE. WE APPRECIATE IT AND
WE ARE -- YOU'RE CORRECT THAT WE'RE NEW TO THE FRAY
HERE.

THIS INTERVENTION MOTION, YOUR HONOR, IS STRAIGHTFORWARD. WE'RE HERE ON BEHALF OF ACTUALLY THREE PERSONS SEEKING INTERVENTION. THE APPLICANT INTERVENORS ARE TYLER AND CAMERON WINKLEVOSS, WHO ARE BROTHERS, AND DIVYA NARENDRA, AS YOUR HONOR IS AWARE, THE INDIVIDUALS WHO SIGNED THE TERM SHEET WHICH YOUR HONOR HELD ENFORCEABLE AND THAT IS GOING TO BE THE SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL.

ONE OF THE TERMS OF THAT TERM SHEET IS THAT FACEBOOK GETS OWNERSHIP OF CONNECTU STOCK.

1 16:50:44 16:50:47 2 16:50:50 3 16:50:52 4 16:50:55 **5** 16:50:59 6 16:51:02 7 16:51:04 8 16:51:05 9 16:51:07 10 16:51:11 11 16:51:14 12 16:51:17 13 16:51:20 14 16:51:23 15 16:51:26 16 16:51:27 17 16:51:29 18 16:51:31 19 16:51:35 20 16:51:38 21 16:51:40 22 16:51:43 23 16:51:45 24 16:51:46 25

UNTIL VERY RECENTLY, JUDGE, MY CLIENTS
BELIEVED, AND HAD A SOUND BASIS FOR THAT BELIEF,
THEY BELIEVED THAT THEIR RIGHTS ON APPEAL COULD BE
ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY CONNECTU SINCE YOUR HONOR
HAD APPOINTED A SPECIAL MASTER, MR. FISHER, WHO IS
HERE TODAY, TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO, AND WE WERE
AT THAT POINT HAPPY WITH THAT, WITH THAT STATE OF
EVENTS.

SINCE THEN, YOUR HONOR, FACEBOOK HAS BEEN ASSERTING THAT IT WILL TAKE CONTROL OF CONNECTU'S LITIGATIONS ONCE IT TAKES CONTROL OF CONNECTU'S STOCK, AND WE'VE BECOME VERY CONCERNED THAT WHILE CONNECTU'S APPEAL IS PENDING IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT, THAT FACEBOOK WILL TRY TO ASSUME CONTROL OF CONNECTU AND ABANDON OR OTHERWISE HAMPER OR IMPAIR THE APPEAL.

I UNDERSTAND FROM MR. UNDERHILL, WHO
REPRESENTS CONNECTU, THAT HE HAS ASKED FOR
ASSURANCES FROM MR. CHATTERJEE, FACEBOOK'S COUNSEL,
THAT MY CLIENTS' RIGHTS WILL NOT BE -- AND
CONNECTU'S RIGHTS WILL NOT BE IMPAIRED ON APPEAL,
THAT THE APPEAL WILL BE ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD.

BUT FACEBOOK HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO AGREE TO GIVE THOSE ASSURANCES.

AND, INDEED, IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE

1 16:51:49 16:51:51 2 16:51:53 16:51:54 4 16:51:56 5 16:51:58 6 16:52:02 7 16:52:06 8 16:52:07 9 16:52:08 10 16:52:10 11 16:52:10 12 16:52:12 13 16:52:14 14 16:52:17 15 16:52:18 16 16:52:20 17 16:52:23 18 16:52:26 19 16:52:29 20 16:52:30 21 16:52:35 22 16:52:37 23 16:52:39 24 16:52:42 25

STAY MOTION, JUDGE, THEY'VE NOW SAID THAT THE APPEAL IS, IN FACT, MOOT. THEY'VE TAKEN THAT POSITION.

SO THAT'S WHY WE'RE HERE TODAY, JUDGE.

WE NEED TO INTERVENE. WE NEEDED TO INTERVENE ON

SHORT NOTICE SINCE MY CLIENTS NEED REALLY TO

PRESERVE THEIR RIGHTS ON APPEAL.

AND TO ADDRESS YOUR HONOR'S CONCERNS

ABOUT TRYING TO REOPEN OR RELITIGATE THE UNDERLYING

MATTER, THAT'S NOT OUR PURPOSE BEFORE THE COURT

HERE TODAY.

WHAT OUR PURPOSE IS, IS TO GET THE

COMPLAINT BEFORE THE COURT SO THAT WE CAN PRESERVE

OUR RIGHT TO APPEAL, AND THAT'S WHAT WE'D LIKE TO

DO.

INTERVENTION IS APPROPRIATE, YOUR HONOR,

AND AS YOU KNOW, THE STANDARD FOR, FOR APPLICATION

OF INTERVENTION IS VERY LIBERAL. OUR -- IT'S

APPROPRIATE HERE UNDER BOTH SECTIONS, SUBSECTIONS

OF RULE 24.

FIRST OF ALL, FOR AN INTERVENTION AS A RIGHT, WE MEET ALL FOUR PRONGS OF THE TEST: ONE, WE'RE TIMELY; SECOND, WE HAVE A SIGNIFICANTLY PROTECTABLE INTEREST; THIRD, THE DISPOSITION OF THIS ACTION, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, COULD IMPAIR

16:52:45	1	OUR INTERESTS; AND, FOURTH, OUR INTERESTS NOW ARE
16:52:48	2	NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED OR MAY NOT BE ADEQUATELY
16:52:51	3	PROTECTED BY CONNECTU.
16:52:53	4	MY CLIENTS MEET ALL FOUR PRONGS OF THIS
16:52:56	5	TEST.
16:52:57	6	AND FACEBOOK, FOR ITS PART IN ITS PAPERS,
16:53:00	7	HAS NOT CONTESTED THE SECOND OR THIRD PRONG.
16:53:03	8	SO MY CLIENTS HAVE, AS TO PRONG 2, A
16:53:08	9	CLEAR PROTECTABLE INTEREST IN THEIR OWNERSHIP,
16:53:10	10	THEIR PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONNECTU. THEY HAVE AN
16:53:12	11	INTEREST IN THE CLAIMS AGAINST FACEBOOK, AND
16:53:15	12	FACEBOOK, AGAIN, DOESN'T CHALLENGE THIS.
16:53:18	13	WE ALSO, YOUR HONOR, HAVE AN INTEREST IN
16:53:19	14	THE APPEAL IN THIS CASE.
16:53:21	15	AND FACEBOOK REALLY DOESN'T ADDRESS THAT
16:53:24	16	IN THEIR PAPERS, BECAUSE TO DO SO, I THINK, REALLY
16:53:26	17	REVEALS WHAT FACEBOOK'S TRUE PURPOSE HERE IS, AND
16:53:29	18	THAT IS TO DENY MY CLIENTS THEIR APPELLATE RIGHTS.
16:53:33	19	THE DISPOSITION OF THE ACTION, THE THIRD
16:53:35	20	PRONG, WE ALSO MEET.
16:53:36	21	YOUR HONOR, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THAT
16:53:39	22	WILL IMPAIR THE INTERESTS OF MY CLIENT.
16:53:41	23	YOUR HONOR'S ORDER REQUIRES THEM TO HAND
16:53:44	24	OVER THEIR STOCK TO FACEBOOK, THEIR CONNECTU STOCK
16:53:47	25	TO FACEBOOK TO EXECUTE RELEASES AND DISMISS ALL THE

SO IF YOUR HONOR'S ORDER IS UPHELD, MY 16:53:51 2 CLIENTS WILL LOSE THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CONNECTU 16:53:53 16:53:55 4 SHARES, AND THEIR INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS AGAINST 16:53:58 **5** FACEBOOK. AS TO THE FOURTH PRONG, THEY -- WHETHER 16:53:59 6 16:54:01 7 THE APPLICANTS' INTERESTS ARE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED BY CONNECTU, IF FACEBOOK TAKES CONTROL, 16:54:05 8 16:54:07 9 THAT WILL NOT BE THE CASE, JUDGE. WE MEET THAT FOURTH PRONG BECAUSE OF THAT 16:54:09 10 REASON, AND, AGAIN, THIS FOURTH PRONG ONLY REQUIRES 16:54:11 11 16:54:14 12 A MINIMAL SHOWING. AND A CASE THAT FACEBOOK ACTUALLY CITED 16:54:16 13 IN ITS BRIEF MAKES THAT CLEAR, AND THAT'S THE 16:54:19 14 16:54:21 15 UNITED MINE WORKERS CASE IN THE SUPREME COURT, AND IT SAYS THAT THE MINIMAL SHOWING IS THAT MY 16:54:24 16 CLIENTS' INTERESTS MAY NOT BE ADEQUATELY 16:54:26 17 16:54:28 18 REPRESENTED. 16:54:28 19 AND HERE, YOUR HONOR, WE CAN DO FAR MORE THAN THAT MINIMAL SHOWING. 16:54:31 20 AS I MENTIONED, FACEBOOK IS SEEKING TO 16:54:32 21 16:54:34 22 GAIN CONTROL OF THE CONNECTU SHARES. AND WE SUSPECT, AND HAVE A STRONG BELIEF 16:54:37 23 IN THAT REGARD, IT'S BECAUSE THEY HAVEN'T BEEN 16:54:40 24 16:54:43 25 SUBTLE IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO ACTUALLY TAKE CONTROL

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ACTIONS.

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OF CONNECTU AND EITHER ABANDON OR OTHERWISE IMPAIR
THE APPEAL THAT CONNECTU HAS TAKEN.

THE COURT: SO LET ME INTERRUPT.

THE REASON I GAVE YOU MY INTENDED

DECISION IS TO NARROW THIS, AND I'M CONCERNED THAT

YOUR COMMENTS SEEM TO ARGUE AGAINST YOUR OPPONENT.

IT DOESN'T EMBRACE THE DIRECTION THAT THE COURT

INTENDS TO GO.

SO IF I GRANT YOUR INTERVENTION AND I LIMIT IT TO -- FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL AND POST-JUDGMENT RELIEF, HOW ARE YOU HARMED?

MR. O'SHEA: JUDGE, I THINK IF, IF WHAT
YOUR HONOR AND THE COURT -- IF WHAT THE COURT'S
INTENDING TO DO IS TO ALLOW MY, MY CLIENTS TO
INTERVENE FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPEAL AND
POST-JUDGMENT, I THINK THAT'S SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT
OUR INTERESTS AT THIS POINT.

AND AS I SAY, THE COMPLAINT IS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO REOPEN, FOR EXAMPLE, LIKE THE <u>SNYDER</u>

CASE WHERE SOMEONE COMES IN IN A SHAM PROCEEDING

AND ATTEMPT TO RELITIGATE THIS MATTER BEFORE YOUR

HONOR. THAT'S NOT OUR MOTIVE AT ALL.

THE COURT: WELL, WHAT I'M -- WHAT I'M

INVITING YOU TO COMMENT NEXT ON, I GUESS, IS, FOR

PURPOSES OF MY ORDER, THEN, I WOULD NOT PERMIT YOU

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16:56:20	10
16:56:21	11
16:56:22	12
16:56:25	13
16:56:28	14
16:56:30	15
16:56:34	16
16:56:37	17
16:56:38	18
16:56:41	19
16:56:42	20
16:56:43	21
16:56:47	22
16:56:49	23
16:56:51	24
16:56:56	25

TO FILE YOUR COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION BECAUSE I, I
READ IT AS OPENING UP MATTERS THAT ARE
PRE-JUDGMENT.

IT DOES NOT EMBRACE THE JUDGMENT. IT SEEMS TO ATTACK THE JUDGMENT, WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT COULD HAPPEN ONCE THE JUDGMENT IS SET ASIDE.

IT SEEMS TO ME NECESSARY FOR THERE TO BE
A PROCESS BY WHICH THE JUDGMENT IS SET ASIDE BEFORE
THE LITIGATION OF THE EVENTS PRE-JUDGMENT CAN COME
BACK BEFORE THE COURT.

MR. O'SHEA: I THINK YOUR HONOR IS

CORRECT. I THINK THAT IF -- IF WE FIRST HAVE TO GO

TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT HAS TO

RULE ON, ON YOUR HONOR'S RULING IN THE CASE ON

ENFORCING THE TERM SHEET, THAT -- AT LEAST WE GET

TO VINDICATE OUR APPELLATE RIGHTS.

AND THEN IF WE COME DOWN HERE AND THERE ARE OTHER THINGS TO ADJUDICATE, THEN WE CAN DO THAT IN FRONT OF THIS COURT.

BUT I THINK IT IS SUFFICIENT FOR YOUR HONOR TO ALLOW US TO INTERVENE AT THIS POINT ON THIS CASE FOR APPELLATE PURPOSES.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET ME ASSUME

THAT THAT IS WHAT I WILL DO UNTIL I AM PERSUADED BY

YOUR OPPONENT OTHERWISE.

16:56:58 1	IS THERE ANYTHING MORE, INDEPENDENT OF
16:57:00 2	THE STAY QUESTION, THAT YOU WOULD WISH TO ARGUE AT
16:57:01 3	THIS TIME?
16:57:01 4	MR. O'SHEA: WELL, JUST, YOUR HONOR, THAT
16:57:03 5	I WOULD ASK FOR TIME TO, TIME UNDER RULE 4 TO, TO
16:57:07 6	FILE OUR, OUR APPEAL, AND I THINK 14 DAYS OUGHT TO
16:57:12 7	DO IT.
16:57:12 8	THE COURT: THANK YOU.
16:57:13 9	LET'S HEAR FROM ANYONE WHO OPPOSES THE
16:57:15 10	INTENDED DECISION OF THE COURT.
16:57:17 11	MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR,
16:57:20 12	RESPECTFULLY, WE DISAGREE WITH YOU ON THIS ONE.
16:57:22 13	ONE OF THE COMMENTS YOUR HONOR MADE WHEN,
16:57:24 14	WHEN YOU WERE DISCUSSING YOUR TENTATIVE RULING WAS
16:57:27 15	YOU WEREN'T SURE IF THE THREE INDIVIDUALS WERE
16:57:30 16	PARTIES TO ANY OF THE CASES.
16:57:32 17	AND YOU MIGHT RECALL, YOUR HONOR, AT THE,
16:57:35 18	AT THE MOTION TO ENFORCE HEARING, WHICH WAS THE
16:57:38 19	HEARING BEFORE THE JUDGMENT, WE HAD A DISCUSSION,
16:57:42 20	AND THE DISCUSSION WAS CONNECTU WAS HERE
16:57:46 21	REPRESENTED BY MR. UNDERHILL, AND THE ISSUE WAS,
16:57:49 22	DID THREE SHAREHOLDERS HAVE NOTICE OF THE MOTION
16:57:52 23	AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO OPPOSE?
16:57:54 24	THOSE THREE SHAREHOLDERS ARE THE VERY
16:57:57 25	SAME PEOPLE WHO ARE TRYING TO INTERVENE TODAY.

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THEY HAVE KNOWN ABOUT THIS MOTION, THEY SUBMITTED

DECLARATIONS IN OPPOSITION ON BEHALF OF CONNECTU,

THEY SHOWED UP IN COURT IN BOSTON, YET THEY'VE MADE

THE STRATEGIC DECISION NOT TO OPPOSE THE MOTION

THEMSELVES, AND YOUR HONOR ACKNOWLEDGED THE NOTICE

ISSUE IN YOUR ORDER ENFORCING THE JUDGMENT.

THIS IS NOT SOMEONE NEW. IT'S SOMEONE
THAT'S BEEN INVOLVED IN THIS. THEY SIGNED THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BACK IN FEBRUARY. THEY
PARTICIPATED THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS ON BEHALF OF
CONNECTU, AND THEY MADE A STRATEGIC DECISION NOT TO
GET INVOLVED IN OPPOSING IT THEMSELVES IN
CHALLENGING THE ENFORCEMENT.

YOUR HONOR, UNDER THAT CIRCUMSTANCE, THEY
DID NOT ACT PROMPTLY. THEY MADE A STRATEGIC

DECISION NOT TO GET INVOLVED, AND IN THOSE

CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T THINK

INTERVENTION IS PROPER.

THE COURT: HOW IS -- HOW IS YOUR CLIENT,

OR YOUR CLIENTS, HOW ARE THEY HARMED WITH RESPECT

TO THIS MATTER IF THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS ARE

PERMITTED TO INTERVENE FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL OR

POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS?

MR. CHATTERJEE: WELL, FIRST, YOUR HONOR,
IT WILL DELAY THINGS OBVIOUSLY. YOU JUST HEARD

16:59:07 1 16:59:10 2 16:59:11 3 16:59:14 4 16:59:15 5 16:59:17 6 16:59:19 7 16:59:22 8 16:59:26 9 16:59:29 10 16:59:31 11 16:59:34 12 16:59:36 13 16:59:38 14 16:59:41 15 16:59:43 16 16:59:44 17 16:59:46 18 16:59:49 19 16:59:52 20 16:59:53 21 16:59:55 22 16:59:56 23 17:00:02 24

17:00:09 25

MR. O'SHEA ASK FOR ADDITIONAL TIME.

THE SECOND ISSUE IS THAT IT WILL ALLOW FOR ADDITIONAL LITIGATION, MORE PEOPLE WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH AND THE LIKE.

OUR VIEW IS WE OWN CONNECTU.

THE MOTION. WE EVEN SAID IN OUR OPPOSITION BRIEF,
I MEAN IN OUR REPLY BRIEF THAT THEY WAIVED -- THEY
SUBMITTED SURREPLIES WITH DECLARATIONS FROM
CAMERON WINKLEVOSS, ONE OF THE PEOPLE SEEKING TO
INTERVENE HERE, HAVING TO DEAL WITH THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF ADDING ADDITIONAL PARTIES, WHICH
HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS HARM UNDER, UNDER THE
INTERVENTION CASE LAW, IS, IS SOMETHING THAT IS
PREJUDICIAL. IT CAUSES DELAYS THAT WE SHOULDN'T
HAVE TO FACE.

WE SIGNED AN AGREEMENT. THEY DON'T WANT TO HONOR IT. THEY STILL HAVEN'T PUT THEIR SHARES INTO THE ESCROW, OR INTO THE SPECIAL MASTER'S HANDS.

THE COURT: LET ME POKE AT IT IN A DIFFERENT WAY.

THIS IS A CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE THE THREE INDIVIDUALS, AT LEAST TWO OF THEM PERHAPS, SIGNED THE, THE DOCUMENT THAT CAME BEFORE THE COURT FOR

17:00:14 3

ENFORCEMENT.

MR. CHATTERJEE: ALL THREE OF THEM DID, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: ALL THREE.

NOW, AT THE TIME THEY DID THAT, I DON'T HAVE IT IN FRONT OF ME NOW, BUT THERE WAS A QUESTION THAT CAME UP IN THE COURT'S MIND, AND I ADDRESSED IT IN MY ORDER WITH RESPECT TO THE OBLIGATION OF ALL SIGNATORIES, EVEN THOSE WHO WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE LITIGATION, TO HONOR THE AGREEMENT THAT THEY HAD MADE BECAUSE IT WAS AN OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF ALL SIGNATORIES.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT EVENTUALLY IT MIGHT HAVE BECOME NECESSARY, IF THERE WAS NO VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE, FOR THE COURT TO BRING THEM INTO THE ACTION FOR PURPOSES OF ENFORCING ITS ORDER BY WAY OF A CONTEMPT ORDER OR WHATEVER.

AND SO I'M NOT CERTAIN I UNDERSTAND A

BASIS FOR NOT RECOGNIZING THEM, FIRST AS PARTIES

WHO ARE OBLIGATED TO ABIDE BY THE JUDGMENT OF THE

COURT; AND AT THE SAME TIME, RECOGNIZE THEM AS

PARTIES WHO MAY LEGITIMATELY ARGUE SUCCESSFULLY, OR

NOT, THAT THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN REQUIRING THEM

TO TAKE THE ACTION THAT THE COURT REQUIRED THEM TO

17:00:15 **4**17:00:16 **5**

17:00:27 6 17:00:29 7

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17:01:05 19

17:01:11 20

17:01:15 21

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17:01:26 24

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17:01:32 1 TAKE. 2 MR. CHATTERJEE: A FAIR QUESTION, YOUR 17:01:32 HONOR, AND I THINK THIS GOES DIRECTLY TO THE 17:01:33 3 17:01:35 4 STRATEGIC ISSUE, THE STRATEGIC DECISIONS THAT THE 17:01:39 INDIVIDUALS MADE. 17:01:40 6 RATHER THAN ENTERING INTO THE CASE AND, 17:01:42 7 AND MAKING THE OPPOSITIONS AT THE TIME THEY COULD HAVE, THEY MADE THE STRATEGIC DECISION TO CHALLENGE 17:01:45 8 17:01:49 9 JURISDICTION AND NOTICE. YOUR HONOR FOUND THAT THEY SAID IN THAT 17:01:50 10 AGREEMENT THAT THEY SIGNED THAT THEY WERE SUBJECT 17:01:51 11 17:01:54 12 TO THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT. 17:01:56 13 NOW, I SEE TWO SEPARATE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH YOUR COMMENTS. 17:01:58 14 THE FIRST QUESTION IS, ARE THE 17:01:59 15 INDIVIDUALS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THIS 17:02:01 16 COURT FOR PURPOSES OF THE JUDGMENT THAT'S BEEN 17:02:04 17 17:02:07 18 ENTERED? 17:02:08 19 YOUR HONOR DECIDED THAT THEY IRREVOCABLY SAID THEY WOULD SUBJECT THEMSELVES TO THE 17:02:12 20 17:02:13 21 JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT FOR PURPOSES OF THE 17:02:16 22 ENFORCEMENT OF THIS AGREEMENT. THAT DOESN'T MEAN THEY NEED TO BE A PARTY 17:02:17 23 17:02:19 24 TO THIS LITIGATION. IT MEANS THAT THEY ARE SUBJECT 17:02:21 25 TO THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT.

17:02:23	1	THE SECOND ISSUE IS, ARE THEY A PARTY TO
17:02:25	2	THIS CASE?
17:02:25	3	THEY ARE A PARTY TO THE CASE IN BOSTON.
17:02:28	4	THAT'S BEEN RECOGNIZED.
17:02:29	5	THEY FOUGHT JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE
17:02:33	6	PRIOR TO ENTERING INTO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
17:02:36	7	AND THEY CHOSE NOT TO BECOME PARTIES IN
17:02:39	8	OPPOSING THE, THE OP IN OPPOSING THE MOTION TO
17:02:43	9	ENFORCE.
17:02:43	10	THERE'S NO NEED FOR THEM TO BE REWARDED
17:02:45	11	FOR THOSE STRATEGIC DECISIONS THAT THEY MADE.
17:02:49	12	BUT THEY ARE SEPARATE ISSUES, WHETHER
17:02:51	13	THEY'RE SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
17:02:53	14	AND WHETHER THEY'RE PARTIES AS IT RELATES TO THE
17:02:55	15	ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT.
17:02:57	16	THEY CHOSE NOT TO BE THE LATTER.
17:03:02	17	THE COURT: IS THERE, IN YOUR MIND, A
17:03:04	18	DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OBLIGATION OF THE
17:03:07	19	INDIVIDUALS AND CONNECTU?
17:03:13	20	MR. CHATTERJEE: IS THERE A DIFFERENCE
17:03:14	21	BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUALS AND
17:03:16	22	CONNECTU?
17:03:17	23	YOUR HONOR, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, YOU LISTED
17:03:19	24	ALL OF THEM AS BEING ORDERED TO DO CERTAIN ACTS AND
17:03:23	25	TO EFFECTUATE WHATEVER ACTS WERE NECESSARY IF THERE

17:03:27 1 2 17:03:29 17:03:31 3 17:03:34 4 17:03:37 5 17:03:39 6 17:03:41 7 17:03:44 8 17:03:46 9 17:03:49 10 17:03:53 11 17:03:55 12 17:03:59 13 17:04:01 14 17:04:04 15 17:04:08 16 17:04:13 17 17:04:15 18 17:04:21 19 17:04:22 20 17:04:24 21 17:04:27 22 17:04:30 23 17:04:32 24

17:04:35 25

WAS AN INVOLUNTARY SHAREHOLDER, AND TO THE EXTENT
THAT THAT JUDGMENT READS THAT THEY ALL HAVE
ESSENTIALLY THE SAME SET OF OBLIGATIONS, THEY MIGHT
INDIVIDUALLY HAVE TO DO SOME THINGS UNDER
CONNECTICUT CORPORATE LAW, BUT I READ THE JUDGMENT
AS SAYING THEY HAVE TO DO WHATEVER THEY'RE SUPPOSED
TO DO UNDER CONNECTICUT LAW.

THE COURT: WELL, I'M NOT PERSUADED THAT
THE DELAY THAT WOULD BE OCCASIONED BY ALLOWING THEM
TO INTERVENE, IF I LIMITED IT TO APPEAL, THAT
YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT, WHICH IS THEY MAY GET
ADDITIONAL TIME BEFORE THE APPELLATE COURT TO FILE
THEIR BRIEFS AND TO GET INVOLVED IN THE ACTION, NOR
THE ADDITIONAL LITIGATION THAT WOULD PERHAPS BE
CAUSED BY HAVING NOW YET ANOTHER VOICE SPEAKING ON
THIS ISSUE, IS COMPELLING ENOUGH FOR THE COURT TO
KEEP THEM OUT OF THE CASE.

MY MOTIVATION IS TO -- BECAUSE I THINK MY JUDGMENT IS CORRECT.

MY MOTIVATION IS TO BRING THEM IN THE

CASE SO I CAN ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THEM,

AND IT'S COUNTERINTUITIVE TO THE COURT TO BE IN A

SITUATION WHERE THEY INITIALLY SAID "WE DON'T WANT

TO BE," AND I'M SAYING, "NO, YOU'RE REQUIRED," AND

NOW THEY'RE AGREEING, "WELL, WE WANT TO COME IN,"

17:04:36 1 2. 17:04:40 3 17:04:41 17:04:44 4 17:04:49 5 17:04:51 6 17:04:54 7 17:04:57 8 17:04:59 9 17:05:00 10 17:05:03 11 17:05:06 12 17:05:08 13 17:05:12 14 17:05:16 15 17:05:18 16 17:05:21 17 17:05:26 18 17:05:30 19 17:05:33 20 17:05:35 21 17:05:39 22 17:05:42 23 17:05:45 24 17:05:48 25

AND TO SAY "NO, YOU CAN'T." IT JUST SEEMS COUNTERINTUITIVE TO THE COURT.

I WOULD AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE

INTERVENTION, FOR PURPOSES OF NOW REOPENING THE

LITIGATION AND TREATING IT AS A PRE-JUDGMENT

LITIGATION AND NOW SERVING COMPLAINTS AND GETTING

ANSWERS AND TAKING DISCOVERY AND ALL OF THOSE

MATTERS, THAT WOULD BE A DIFFERENT KIND OF

INTERVENTION.

AND THAT'S WHY I INVITE THE PARTIES TO ADDRESS THE COURT ON THE NATURE OF A LIMITED INTERVENTION. IT'S -- I'VE SEEN CASES THAT RECOGNIZE IT. IT'S JUST NOT ONE OF THOSE THINGS WHERE THE PROCEDURAL BOOKS TALK A LOT ABOUT IT.

BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE

POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS THAT WILL NOW TAKE PLACE,

SUCH AS THE MOTION TO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT OR THE

MOTION TO STAY EXCUSE, I'VE HEARD OF AN APPEAL FOR

WHICH THESE INDIVIDUALS, ONCE THEY'RE IN THE CASE,

CAN BE MADE THE SUBJECT OF ORDERS.

AND RATHER THAN GET AN ORDER AND THEN LATER BRING THEM INTO THE CASE, IT SEEMS TO ME A MORE EFFICIENT WAY IS TO BRING THEM IN NOW.

IF I'M WRONG AND THE JUDGMENT IS SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS BROUGHT BACK, THEY'RE IN THE

17:05:55	1	CASE FOR PURPOSES OF NOW TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT
17:05:57	2	IS THE NATURE OF THIS LITIGATION.
17:05:59	3	THIS WAS A SETTLEMENT OF AN ONGOING
17:06:01	4	LITIGATION.
17:06:02	5	AND SO ONCE THEY INTERVENE, THEY'RE
17:06:05	6	INTERVENING IN THE ONGOING LITIGATION.
17:06:07	7	IF THE ARGUMENT IS THEY HAVE NO PLACE IN
17:06:09	8	THE ONGOING LITIGATION, THAT WHATEVER THEY'RE
17:06:11	9	CONTENDING ABOUT IS NOT SOMETHING THAT WAS THE
17:06:13	10	SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LITIGATION, I'M WILLING TO
17:06:16	11	LISTEN TO THAT.
17:06:17	12	BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THEY'RE IF I
17:06:19	13	ALLOW THEM TO INTERVENE FOR PURPOSES OF A JUDGMENT
17:06:21	14	AND AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT THAT FORCES THEM TO
17:06:23	15	TAKE ACTION THAT THEY'VE AGREED TO, THAT SEEMS TO
17:06:28	16	ME TO BE A LOGICAL THING TO ALLOW.
17:06:30	17	MR. CHATTERJEE: OKAY. YOUR HONOR, THANK
17:06:31	18	YOU.
17:06:32	19	I THINK THERE WERE A COUPLE CONCEPTS IN
17:06:35	20	THERE THAT ARE VERY IMPORTANT AND THAT MAYBE THERE
17:06:38	21	ARE SOME SUBTLETIES THAT WE HAVE NOT YET TALKED
17:06:40	22	ABOUT.
17:06:40	23	I UNDERSTAND WHERE YOU'RE GOING, BUT I
17:06:42	24	THINK THERE ARE A COUPLE OF IMPORTANT THINGS.
17:06:44	25	THE FIRST THING IS I BELIEVE YOUR HONOR

1 17:06:46 17:06:49 2 17:06:51 3 17:06:52 4 17:06:54 5 17:06:57 6 17:07:00 7 17:07:00 8 17:07:01 9 17:07:03 10 17:07:05 11 17:07:08 12 17:07:09 13 17:07:11 14 17:07:13 15 17:07:16 16 17:07:19 17 17:07:22 18 17:07:24 19 17:07:25 20 17:07:26 21 17:07:28 22 17:07:32 23 17:07:34 24 17:07:36 25

IS GOING TO BE AFFIRMED AT THE NINTH CIRCUIT. I
THINK IT WAS A SOUND DECISION BASED UPON NINTH
CIRCUIT LAW.

IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THERE WERE A REVERSAL, I WOULD NOT WANT THIS INTERVENTION TO ALLOW THEM TO GET OUT OF THE CASE IN CALIFORNIA AGAIN.

THE COURT: TO GET OUT?

MR. CHATTERJEE: TO GET OUT, BECAUSE YOUR HONOR SAID YOU WERE ONLY ALLOWING THEM A LIMITED INTERVENTION. IF THEY'RE IN, THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THAT SHOULD BE WHATEVER HAPPENS.

THE COURT: OH, YES. MY ORDER WOULD BE TO INTERVENE FOR PURPOSES OF POST-JUDGMENT AND APPEAL, SO THAT ONCE THEY'RE IN FOR PURPOSES OF POST-JUDGMENT, I WOULD REGARD ANY CASE THAT WAS BROUGHT BACK ON REMAND AS POST-JUDGMENT AND, THEREFORE, THEY WOULD BE IN FOR PURPOSES OF THOSE PROCEEDINGS.

MR. CHATTERJEE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE SECOND ISSUE IS I DO THINK THIS ISSUE

HAS TO BE DEALT WITH ON THEIR STRATEGIC DECISION

NOT TO OPPOSE THE MOTION BEFORE YOUR HONOR.

IF YOU'RE ALLOWING THEM TO INTERVENE, WHATEVER RIGHTS THEY HAVE AT THIS POINT IN TIME,

17:07:38	1	HAVING CHOSEN NOT TO OPPOSE THE MOTION, IS WHAT
17:07:41	2	THEY HAVE. THEY CAN'T ALL OF A SUDDEN COME IN AND
17:07:43	3	STEP INTO THE SHOES OF CONNECTU.
17:07:46	4	THE COURT: I'M SORRY. SAY MORE ABOUT
17:07:47	5	THAT. WHAT MOTION?
17:07:48	6	MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, WHEN WE
17:07:51	7	FILED THE MOTION TO ENFORCE
17:07:52	8	THE COURT: YES.
17:07:53	9	MR. CHATTERJEE: THE CONNECTU
17:07:55	10	SHAREHOLDERS, I'LL CALL THEM THE CONNECTU FOUNDERS,
17:07:58	11	DIVYA NARENDRA, CAMERON WINKLEVOSS, AND TYLER
17:08:03	12	WINKLEVOSS SUBMITTED DECLARATIONS, SOME OF THEM
17:08:05	13	SUBMITTED DECLARATIONS ON BEHALF OF CONNECTU.
17:08:07	14	BUT THEY MADE THE CHOICE NOT TO INTERVENE
17:08:10	15	THEN. THEY MADE THE CHOICE NOT TO BE PARTIES IN
17:08:12	16	OPPOSITION TO THAT ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
17:08:15	17	IF THEY DECIDE THEY WANT TO INTERVENE
17:08:18	18	NOW, AFTER JUDGMENT'S ENTERED, THEY SHOULD NOT BE
17:08:21	19	ABLE TO STEP INTO THE SHOES OF CONNECTU ON APPEAL.
17:08:24	20	WHATEVER RIGHTS THEY HAVE, HAVING MADE
17:08:25	21	THE DECISION NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OPPOSITION
17:08:28	22	OF THE MOTION, THEY SHOULD BE STUCK WITH THE
17:08:30	23	CONSEQUENCES OF THAT GIVEN THEIR STRATEGIC CHOICE.
17:08:34	24	THE COURT: I'M STILL NOT UNDERSTANDING.
17:08:36	25	THE MOTION TO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT IS THE MOTION

THAT ENDED IN A JUDGMENT. 17:08:41 1 17:08:42 2 MR. CHATTERJEE: CORRECT. THE COURT: AND NOW THERE IS AN APPEAL. 17:08:43 I PRESUME THAT, IN THAT APPEAL, CONNECTU, 17:08:50 4 THROUGH ITS OFFICERS OR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES, 17:08:54 5 TAKES THE POSITION THAT THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET 17:08:58 6 17:09:01 7 ASIDE. MR. CHATTERJEE: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 17:09:01 8 17:09:03 9 AND LET ME JUST --THE COURT: AND THESE INDIVIDUALS WOULD 17:09:04 10 BE TAKING A CONSISTENT POSITION. 17:09:05 11 17:09:08 12 MR. CHATTERJEE: YES, YOUR HONOR. HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON WHAT HAPPENS WITH 17:09:09 13 CONNECTU -- I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT'S GOING TO 17:09:11 14 17:09:14 15 HAPPEN WITH THAT, BUT ON APPEAL, IF THE INDIVIDUALS ARE THE ONLY PEOPLE LEFT -- SO, FOR EXAMPLE, THE 17:09:17 16 17:09:21 17 CONCERN THAT MR. O'SHEA HAS, IF FACEBOOK BECOMES 17:09:25 18 THE OWNER OF CONNECTU, IF IT MAKES THE DECISION 17:09:27 19 THAT IT'S NOT IN THE BUSINESS'S INTEREST TO CONTINUE THE APPEAL, THEN THE INDIVIDUALS SHOULD 17:09:30 20 NOT BE ABLE TO ASSUME THE RIGHTS OF CONNECTU 17:09:32 21 17:09:35 22 BECAUSE THEY MADE THE DECISION NOT TO OPPOSE THE 17:09:37 23 MOTION. 17:09:38 24 THE COURT: AH, OKAY, YES. I HAVEN'T QUITE FIGURED OUT ALL OF THE NUANCES OF THAT 17:09:40 25

1 17:09:43 17:09:46 2 17:09:51 3 17:09:55 4 17:09:58 5 17:10:03 6 17:10:08 7 17:10:09 8 17:10:14 9 17:10:14 10 17:10:16 11 17:10:19 12 17:10:21 13 17:10:21 14 17:10:24 15 17:10:32 16 17:10:33 17 17:10:39 18 17:10:43 19 17:10:47 20 17:10:51 21 17:10:54 22 17:10:57 23 17:10:59 24

17:11:03 25

PROBLEM, BUT I DID GET A LITTLE BIT OF IT.

ONE OF THE CONCERNS IS IF THE -- IF

FACEBOOK PROCEEDS TO ACQUIRE, THROUGH EXECUTION ON

THE JUDGMENT OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT, THE

SHARES OF CONNECTU, WOULD THESE INDIVIDUALS, IN

SOME CAPACITY, BE ABLE TO PROCEED IF CONNECTU

DOESN'T WANT TO PROCEED?

MR. CHATTERJEE: CORRECT, AND WHAT RIGHTS WOULD THEY HAVE.

THEY MAY BE ABLE TO PROCEED IN ANY EVENT,
BUT THEIR RIGHTS MAY BE DIFFERENT THAN THE RIGHTS
OF CONNECTU BECAUSE CONNECTU MADE THE DECISION TO
OPPOSE.

THE COURT: WELL, CAN I DEFER THAT UNTIL I LEARN MORE ABOUT THIS QUESTION ON, ON ENFORCING, ON STAYING THE JUDGMENT?

BECAUSE IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT WHETHER
ACTION IS STAYED PENDING APPEAL AND HOW THAT IS
DONE IS NOW TIED IN WITH THE POWER THAT FACEBOOK
WOULD SEEK TO EXERCISE SHOULD IT BECOME, AS A
RESULT OF THIS PROCESS, THE OWNER OF CONNECTU.

AND WHAT YOU'RE ASKING THE COURT FOR IS

SOME RULING WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHTS OF THOSE

INDIVIDUALS ONCE THAT -- IF THAT SHOULD HAPPEN.

AND I DON'T HAVE AN ANSWER TO THAT.

17:11:05 1	MR. CHATTERJEE: IT REALLY GOES TO THE
17:11:07 2	SCOPE OF THE INTERVENTION, YOUR HONOR, BECAUSE YOU
17:11:09 3	HAD STARTED BY SAYING IT'S A LIMITED INTERVENTION.
17:11:11 4	THE COURT: WELL, LET ME SEE IF I CAN
17:11:13 5	ANSWER THAT TO SEE IF THEY ARE MY UNDERSTANDING
17:11:16 6	IS THAT THEY ARE SEEKING TO INTERVENE AS
17:11:18 7	INDIVIDUALS AND IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY.
17:11:20 8	THEY'RE NOT SEEKING TO INTERVENE AS REPRESENTATIVE
17:11:22 9	OF CONNECTU OR ON BEHALF OF CONNECTU.
17:11:24 10	AND MY RULING ALLOWING THEM TO INTERVENE
17:11:27 11	WOULD BE TO INTERVENE AS INDIVIDUALS IN THEIR
17:11:29 12	INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY.
17:11:32 13	DOES THAT HELP?
17:11:33 14	MR. CHATTERJEE: I DON'T KNOW IF IT
17:11:34 15	RESOLVES THE QUESTION I WAS ASKING. IF BECAUSE
17:11:37 16	IT SOUNDS LIKE THE INTERVENTION IS, IS FOR ANYTHING
17:11:41 17	POST-JUDGMENT THAT OCCURS.
17:11:43 18	THE COURT: RIGHT.
17:11:44 19	MR. CHATTERJEE: AND THEN
17:11:45 20	THE COURT: BUT IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
17:11:46 21	CAPACITY.
17:11:47 22	IN OTHER WORDS, ONCE THEY'RE IN THE CASE,
17:11:49 23	THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SAY, "I AM NOW SPEAKING
17:11:52 24	ON BEHALF OF CONNECTU AND, THEREFORE, I TAKE THIS
17:11:56 25	POSITION ON, THIS POSITION ON BEHALF OF CONNECTU."

17:11:59	1	MR. CHATTERJEE: RIGHT. AND, YOUR HONOR,
17:12:00	2	PERHAPS IF THAT'S YOUR HONOR'S RULING, WE WOULD
17:12:02	3	LIKE GUIDANCE AS FAR AS WHAT IS IT THAT THEY'RE
17:12:06	4	ALLOWED TO INTERVENE ON?
17:12:08	5	HOWEVER, IF YOU THINK THAT'S AN ISSUE
17:12:10	6	THAT'S LEFT BETTER FOR A LATER DAY OR IN FRONT OF
17:12:12	7	THE NINTH CIRCUIT, WE CAN DEAL WITH THAT THERE.
17:12:15	8	THE COURT: WELL, LET ME HEAR FROM
17:12:17	9	MR. O'SHEA AGAIN, OR PERHAPS MR. UNDERHILL WOULD
17:12:20	10	WANT TO SPEAK TO THIS.
17:12:22	11	BUT IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT I UNDERSTAND
17:12:24	12	THEIR DESIRE TO INTERVENE IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
17:12:27	13	CAPACITIES AND TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTIONS
17:12:31	14	POST-JUDGMENT THAT THEY MIGHT TAKE IN THEIR
17:12:33	15	INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES.
17:12:34	16	MR. O'SHEA: I THINK THAT'S RIGHT, YOUR
17:12:35	17	HONOR. I THINK WHAT MR. CHATTERJEE IS TRYING TO DO
17:12:38	18	IS ESSENTIALLY TRICK IS GIVE WITH ONE HAND AND
17:12:42	19	TAKE AWAY WITH THE OTHER.
17:12:43	20	YOU SEE, YOUR HONOR, THE REASON WHY WE'RE
17:12:45	21	SEEKING TO INTERVENE IS TO VINDICATE OUR RIGHTS.
17:12:48	22	PRIOR TO TODAY, WE WERE SATISFIED WITH
17:12:50	23	CONNECTU'S VINDICATING OUR RIGHTS, IF YOU WILL.
17:12:54	24	BUT AND SO WE WERE CONTENT TO SIT ON THE SIDES.
17:12:58	25	IT'S ONLY BECAUSE OF FACEBOOK'S ATTEMPT

17:13:00 1 2 17:13:03 17:13:05 3 17:13:07 4 17:13:10 5 17:13:13 6 17:13:15 7 17:13:17 8 17:13:19 9 17:13:21 10 17:13:23 11 17:13:26 12 17:13:30 13 17:13:35 14 17:13:36 15 17:13:38 16 17:13:41 17 17:13:43 18 17:13:44 19 17:13:46 20 17:13:49 21 17:13:50 22 17:13:53 23 17:13:55 24

17:13:58 25

TO DEPRIVE US OF OUR RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE TERM SHEET THAT WE'RE HERE.

IF -- IF WHAT MR. CHATTERJEE IS SAYING

IS, WELL, YOU CAN GO AHEAD AND ALLOW INTERVENTION,

BUT THEY'RE -- THEY CAN'T CHALLENGE THE TERM SHEET

BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T CHALLENGE IT BACK THEN WHEN

CONNECTU WAS CHALLENGING ON THEIR BEHALF, THAT'S

NONSENSE, JUDGE.

IT'S ALLOWING INTERVENTION.

AND I CHALLENGE MR. CHATTERJEE TO COME UP
WITH ONE CASE WHERE A COURT ALLOWED INTERVENTION
BY, BY AN INTERVENING PARTY TO PRESERVE AN APPEAL,
FOR EXAMPLE, <u>UNITED AIRLINES</u>, FOR EXAMPLE,

PELLEGRINO VERSUS NESBIT, WHERE THE COURT SAID,
"WE'RE ALLOWING YOU TO INTERVENE, BUT WE'RE GOING
TO CIRCUMSCRIBE THOSE RIGHTS TO INTERVENE."

I THINK WHAT YOUR HONOR INITIALLY SAID
WAS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. WE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
INTERVENE POST-JUDGMENT, TO CHALLENGE THIS
COURT'S -- TO RESPECTFULLY CHALLENGE THIS COURT'S
DECISION THEN POST-JUDGMENT.

WE'RE NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEKING TO REOPEN AND RELITIGATE THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT.

I THINK WHAT MR. CHATTERJEE IS DOING IS CLEVER, BUT IT'S A TRICK, AND WHAT IT'S TRYING TO

17:14:00	1	DO IS GET THIS COURT TO DO SOMETHING THAT WOULD
17:14:01	2	CIRCUMSCRIBE OUR RIGHTS OF APPEAL, WHICH IS THE
17:14:05	3	PRECISE REASON WHY WE'RE HERE, YOUR HONOR.
17:14:07	4	THE COURT: IS IT TRUE THAT YOU WANT TO
17:14:09	5	CIRCUMSCRIBE HIS RIGHTS ON APPEAL?
17:14:11	б	MR. CHATTERJEE: OF COURSE, YOUR HONOR.
17:14:12	7	THE COURT: WHAT IS IT THAT YOU WOULD
17:14:13	8	WISH TO HAVE THE COURT CIRCUMSCRIBE WITH RESPECT TO
17:14:15	9	HIS APPEAL?
17:14:16	10	MR. CHATTERJEE: WE DON'T WANT THE
17:14:17	11	INDIVIDUALS TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK AN APPEAL.
17:14:20	12	IT'S NOT SIMPLE. THEY MADE THE CHOICE
17:14:22	13	NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDING, AND WE
17:14:24	14	SHOULDN'T BE PREJUDICED BY HAVING TO DEAL WITH THAT
17:14:26	15	NOW.
17:14:26	16	MR. BARRETT STOOD UP AT THE HEARING
17:14:30	17	THE COURT: ISN'T THAT TANTAMOUNT TO
17:14:31	18	DENYING THEM THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE? BECAUSE IF I
17:14:34	19	ALLOW THEM TO INTERVENE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT, AS
17:14:36	20	PARTIES NOW, THEY WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL.
17:14:38	21	SO THAT GOES BACK TO YOUR ARGUMENT IS
17:14:41	22	I SHOULDN'T ALLOW THEM TO INTERVENE, BECAUSE IF I
17:14:45	23	GIVE THAT RIGHT, THEY WOULD BE PERMITTED AS PARTIES
17:14:47	24	NOW, IF THEY ARE AFFECTED ADVERSELY BY THE
17:14:50	25	JUDGMENT, TO APPEAL.

17:14:51 1 17:14:52 2 17:14:53 17:14:55 4 17:14:57 5 17:14:59 6 17:15:03 7 17:15:05 8 17:15:07 9 17:15:10 10 17:15:12 11 17:15:14 12 17:15:15 13 17:15:20 14 17:15:23 15 17:15:26 16 17:15:29 17 17:15:32 18 17:15:35 19 17:15:37 20 17:15:40 21 17:15:42 22 17:15:44 23 17:15:45 24 17:15:47 25

MR. CHATTERJEE: CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. THAT'S THE ISSUE.

AND THERE'S NO TRICK HERE. WE FILED A

MOTION TO ENFORCE. WE FILED THE MOTION TO ENFORCE.

WE SERVED IT IN BOSTON. THE INDIVIDUALS HAD HAD

NOTICE AND THEY DECIDED NOT TO COME IN. THEY MADE

A STRATEGIC DECISION ON THAT.

THERE'S NO TRICK. THEY KNEW THAT THIS

WAS COMING AND WE WERE GOING TO TRY AND TAKE

CONNECTU AS A COMPANY. THEY MADE THE DECISION NOT

TO GET INVOLVED.

YOUR HONOR, I -- I DON'T KNOW WHY

MR. O'SHEA IS SO INFLAMED. THEY HAD NOTICE OF IT.

COUNSEL FOR THE WINKLEVOSS BROTHERS AND NARENDRA

STOOD UP AT THE MOTION TO ENFORCE HEARING AND

ARGUED TO YOUR HONOR -- IN BOSTON, THEY HAD A

SEPARATE PROCEEDING WHERE DIVYA NARENDRA AND

HOWARD WINKLEVOSS WERE THERE.

THEY CAN'T COME IN NOW AND SAY THIS IS A TIMELY APPLICATION. THEY MADE A STRATEGIC DECISION NOT TO GET INVOLVED AND THEY SHOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THAT BECAUSE THEY KNEW WHAT THEY WERE DOING.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. NOW, LET ME HOLD
THIS IN ABEYANCE. I'M NOT SURE THAT THIS IS THE

1 17:15:50 17:15:52 2 17:15:55 17:15:58 4 17:16:01 5 17:16:03 6 17:16:08 7 17:16:16 8 17:16:18 9 17:16:21 10 17:16:24 11 17:16:26 12 17:16:28 13 17:16:29 14 17:16:32 15 17:16:34 16 17:16:35 17 17:16:36 18 17:16:39 19 17:16:43 20 17:16:45 21 17:16:47 22 17:16:52 23 17:16:56 24 17:16:59 25

TIME ON THE FIRST MOTION OR ALL MOTIONS.

I DO HAVE A CONCERN THAT MY STAFF -- I

GAVE THEM A PROMISE WE'D ONLY KEEP THIS TO ABOUT AN

HOUR, SO CAN I TURN QUICKLY NOW TO THE OTHER

MATTER, KEEPING THIS AS SOMETHING THAT I HAVE UNDER

CONSIDERATION, AND THAT IS THIS MOTION TO STAY

EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT.

THIS IS YOUR MOTION, MR. UNDERHILL?

MR. UNDERHILL: YES, YOUR HONOR. I'D

LIKE TO RESERVE THREE MINUTES, PLEASE.

AND, AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, I'VE GOT A LOT OF GROUND TO COVER. IF THERE ARE SPECIFIC ISSUES THAT YOU WANT ME TO ADDRESS, PLEASE DIRECT ME.

THE COURT: WELL, I THINK EVERY -- LET ME COMMENT ON THAT THE WAY I DID THE OTHER ONE.

MR. UNDERHILL: SURE.

THE COURT: I THINK, FROM WHAT I CAN SEE,
EVERYBODY IS ON ALL FOURS THAT THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE
SITUATION THAT WOULD BE RESOLVABLE AS IT WOULD IF I
HAD A MONEY JUDGMENT AND YOU COULD POST A BOND.

THIS IS A SITUATION WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT

TO A SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE THE STAY HAS TO BE ADDRESSED AS,

AS YOU WOULD IF THERE WERE INDIVIDUAL ACTS THAT

HAVE TO -- THAT ARE AFFECTED BY IT.

17:17:02 1 2 17:17:09 3 17:17:12 17:17:17 4 17:17:24 17:17:28 6 17:17:31 7 17:17:34 8 17:17:35 9 17:17:42 10 17:17:45 11 17:17:47 12 17:17:49 13 17:17:53 14 17:17:55 15 17:17:58 16 17:18:01 17 17:18:06 18 17:18:08 19 17:18:12 20 17:18:15 21 17:18:19 22 17:18:23 23 17:18:27 24

17:18:30 25

AND IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT, AS THE COURT THAT ISSUED THE JUDGMENT, I HAVE TO PAY ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE VALUE OF THIS JUDGMENT TO BOTH PARTIES, AS I SAW IT, WAS A TIMELY COMBINATION OF EXCHANGE OF CASH AND STOCK, AND THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE PARTIES WERE, WERE -- ARE AFFECTED BY A DELAY WHICH MIGHT AFFECT THE VALUE OF THE CONSIDERATION.

AND SO IF THE PARTY IS -- IF ONE PARTY TO THIS IS NOW DISAPPOINTED AND WISHES TO APPEAL, IT'S GOING TO AFFECT THE TIMELINESS AND THE VALUE OF THE CONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER PARTY.

AND THAT COULD BE SAID, AT THIS POINT, BY EITHER PARTY. EITHER ONE COULD HAVE SAID, "NO, THIS ISN'T RIGHT, I DON'T WANT TO GO AHEAD."

AND SO TO STAY EXECUTION IS, IS SOMETHING WHICH SAYS, "WE WANT YOU TO CHANGE THE VALUE OF THE CONSIDERATION THAT WAS GOING ON AT THE POINT OF THE SETTLEMENT, AND WE NEED TO HAVE YOU IGNORE THE PARTIES' DETERMINATIONS OF THOSE VALUES AT THE TIME," AND ALLOW THAT TO CHANGE AT, AT THE RISK THAT IT WILL DO VIOLENCE TO THE VERY DEAL THAT THE PARTIES PUT TOGETHER FOR A HIGHER GOOD, WHICH IS TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT THERE REALLY WAS A SETTLEMENT.

SO THAT'S KIND OF HOW I'M APPROACHING IT.

17:18:32	1
17:18:34	2
17:18:36	3
17:18:40	4
17:18:45	5
17:18:48	6
17:18:50	7
17:18:53	8
17:18:56	9
17:18:59	10
17:19:03	11
17:19:06	12
17:19:07	13
17:19:14	14
17:19:19	15
17:19:22	16
17:19:24	17
17:19:26	18
17:19:29	19
17:19:32	20
17:19:34	21
17:19:35	22
17:19:39	23
17:19:44	24
17:19:47	25

MR. UNDERHILL: OKAY. LET ME TRY TO

JUMP, I GUESS, THEN, TO THIS IDEA OF FACEBOOK'S

INTEREST IN CONNECTU PENDING THE APPEAL.

FIRST OF ALL, YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE IT TO

VERY MUCH BE THE CASE THAT THE VALUE THAT CHANGED

HANDS HERE WITH RESPECT TO, FROM THE FACEBOOK SIDE

TO THE CONNECTU SIDE, WAS SETTLEMENT OF AN

EXTREMELY VALUABLE CLAIM.

CONNECTU ITSELF, THE BUSINESS, IS

EXTREMELY SMALL. IT GETS ABOUT 100 HITS A MONTH.

IT PRODUCES ABSOLUTELY NO REVENUE OF ANY KIND.

NEVER HAS.

SO THE IDEA OF EXCHANGING THE STOCK WAS

AN ELEGANT -- IN RETROSPECT, NOT SO ELEGANT -- WAY

OF SETTLING THE LAWSUIT.

WE ARE MORE THAN HAPPY TO DO AN EXPEDITED APPEAL. WE HAVE SUBMITTED PAPERS TO THE COURT WITH RESPECT TO THE RELEASE ISSUE WHERE WE SAY WE'RE WILLING TO DO AN EXPEDITED APPEAL.

THAT LANGUAGE WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO FACEBOOK.

AND IT IS CLEAR TO US, YOUR HONOR, THAT

AT EVERY TURN, EVERYTHING POST-JUDGMENT, WHICH

OBVIOUSLY WE RESPECTFULLY DISAGREE WITH, EVERYTHING

THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAS DONE IS DESIGNED TO KEEP US

17:19:51 1 17:19:53 2 17:19:59 3 17:20:01 4 17:20:03 5 17:20:05 6 17:20:09 7 17:20:13 8 17:20:15 9 17:20:18 10 17:20:21 11 17:20:23 12 17:20:26 13 17:20:29 14 17:20:33 15 17:20:36 16 17:20:42 17 17:20:46 18 17:20:49 19 17:20:51 20 17:20:52 21 17:20:53 22

17:20:55 23

17:20:58 24

17:21:00 25

FROM HAVING A MEANINGFUL APPEAL.

AND SO THERE IS THIS THREAT THAT IF THEY
CAN GET THEIR HANDS ON CONNECTU, THEY'RE GOING TO
SHUT DOWN THE APPEAL.

WE -- WE ALSO BELIEVE WE HAVE A MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST PRIOR COUNSEL.

THERE AT LEASE IMPLICITLY, IF NOT

EXPRESSLY, IS THE IDEA THAT THEY MAY SHUT THAT

DOWN, TOO, AND EXPOSE THE INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS

TO LIABILITIES THAT THEY MIGHT NOT OTHERWISE HAVE,

IF FACEBOOK IS ABLE TO DO THAT.

SO WE'RE HERE, YOUR HONOR, TO BE THE MOST REASONABLE THAT WE POSSIBLY CAN AND FIGURE OUT SOME WAY TO GET AN APPEAL THAT IS PRACTICAL.

AND, YOU KNOW, POSTING A BOND OF TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IS SIMPLY NOT PRACTICAL TO HAVE THE APPELLATE COURT HEAR WHAT I TRULY BELIEVE ARE SOME PRETTY NOVEL IDEAS, AND I DO WANT TO SPEND JUST A COUPLE OF MINUTES ON THE LAW HERE IN A MINUTE.

BUT WE'RE WILLING TO DO ANYTHING

REASONABLE. WE'RE WILLING TO TURN THE COMPANY OVER

TO MR. FISHER. MR. FISHER CAN MAKE ANY OPERATIONAL

DECISIONS, NOT THAT THERE ARE ANY OPERATIONAL

DECISIONS.

17:21:01	1	WHAT GOES ON NOW IS THERE'S A CHECK
17:21:03	2	THAT'S WRITTEN EVERY MONTH FOR THE RENTAL OF THE
17:21:05	3	SERVER. THAT'S IT. WE'LL WRITE THE CHECK. HE
17:21:08	4	DOESN'T EVEN HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THAT.
17:21:10	5	WE WILL NOT MAKE A SINGLE OPERATIONAL
17:21:12	6	CHANGE IN THE SLIGHTEST. YOU KNOW, WE'LL PUT IT
17:21:17	7	OUT OF OUR HANDS.
17:21:18	8	IN FACT, YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD EVEN BE
17:21:20	9	WILLING TO LET CONNECTU OPERATE THE BUSINESS.
17:21:22	10	NOW, THAT'S VERY DISTINCT, BY THE WAY,
17:21:26	11	FROM HAVING THE COMPANY. WE DON'T AGREE THAT THEY
17:21:26	12	CAN HAVE
17:21:26	13	THE COURT: FACEBOOK.
17:21:27	14	MR. UNDERHILL: I'M SORRY?
17:21:27	15	THE COURT: YOU SAID CONNECTU.
17:21:28	16	MR. UNDERHILL: I'M SORRY.
17:21:29	17	THE COURT: YOU MEAN FACEBOOK.
17:21:31	18	MR. UNDERHILL: MY MISTAKE. I MEANT TO
17:21:33	19	SAY FACEBOOK.
17:21:35	20	OBVIOUSLY WE WILL NOT VOLUNTARILY PERMIT
17:21:37	21	THEM TO TAKE OVER OUR APPEAL BECAUSE WE DON'T THINK
17:21:39	22	THEY WOULD DO AS GOOD A JOB AS WE WILL.
17:21:39	23	WE'RE NOT GOING TO LET THEM TAKE OVER THE
17:21:39	24	MALPRACTICE CASE.
17:21:41	25	BUT IF THEY REALLY JUST WANT TO OPERATE

17:21:42	1	THIS THING, IF THEY WANT TO WRITE THE CHECK TO THE
17:21:45	2	SERVER, YOU KNOW, ONCE A MONTH, IF THEY WANT TO
17:21:49	3	REWRITE THE CODE, IF THEY WANT TO START
17:21:51	4	ADVERTISING, THEY CAN DO WHATEVER THEY WANT WITH
17:21:53	5	IT, IT'S THEIRS, AS LONG AS WE CAN KEEP OWNERSHIP
17:21:56	6	OF CONNECTU SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY AN APPEAL.
17:21:59	7	NOW, WHAT WE HEARD IN THE PRIOR MOTION IS
17:22:03	8	ONE MORE GAMUT TO TRY TO DENY US AN APPEAL.
17:22:07	9	AS MUCH AS MR. CHATTERJEE EXPRESSES
17:22:10	10	CONFIDENCE IN THE COURT'S OPINION, HE SURE IS
17:22:13	11	TRYING AWFULLY HARD TO KEEP THE NINTH CIRCUIT FROM
17:22:16	12	EVER HEARING THESE ISSUES.
17:22:17	13	THE COURT: LET ME ASK THIS, COUNSEL.
17:22:19	14	MR. UNDERHILL: YES, YOUR HONOR.
17:22:20	15	THE COURT: IF I GO ALONG WITH THIS
17:22:24	16	PROPOSAL I'M NOT SAYING I WILL AND THERE IS
17:22:29	17	AN APPEAL THAT IS PURSUED INDEPENDENT OF CONNECTU,
17:22:35	18	WHO PAYS FOR THE COST OF THE APPEAL?
17:22:38	19	MR. UNDERHILL: WE'LL TAKE CARE OF THAT,
17:22:40	20	YOUR HONOR. NO PROBLEM.
17:22:41	21	THE COURT: WHO'S "WE"?
17:22:42	22	MR. UNDERHILL: IT WON'T BE CONNECTU.
17:22:45	23	I'LL WORK IT OUT WITH THE SHAREHOLDERS.
17:22:47	24	THE COURT: AH. I SEE.
17:22:48	25	AND SO YOU'RE REQUESTING, ESSENTIALLY, TO

17:22:52	1	BE ABLE TO UNDO THE SETTLEMENT, BUT TO ALLOW THEM
17:22:58	2	TO OPERATE THE COMPANY.
17:22:59	3	NOW, WHEN THE SETTLEMENT IS UNDONE, IF IT
17:23:04	4	IS UNDONE BY A REVERSAL, YOUR UNDERSTANDING IS
17:23:07	5	YOU'D GO BACK TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, WHICH MEANS
17:23:10	6	THAT THE COMPANY WOULD BE GIVEN BACK AND RESTART
17:23:14	7	ALL THE LITIGATION?
17:23:14	8	MR. UNDERHILL: RIGHT. AND, AND FACEBOOK
17:23:18	9	WOULD NEED TO KEEP IT SO THEY COULD GIVE IT BACK,
17:23:21	10	YOU KNOW, AT THE END.
17:23:23	11	THE IF WE NEED A HEARING, YOUR HONOR,
17:23:25	12	ON THE VALUE OF CONNECTU AND IS THIS AT ALL
17:23:29	13	HARMING, THAT SEEMS LIKE AN AWFUL BIG WASTE OF
17:23:32	14	TIME.
17:23:32	15	I MEAN, WHAT THIS CASE WAS ABOUT, AGAIN,
17:23:34	16	WAS SETTLING AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE CLAIM.
17:23:37	17	NOW, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY, YOUR HONOR,
17:23:39	18	THAT THE QUESTIONS THAT WE'RE GOING TO BE
17:23:40	19	PRESENTING TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND BY THE WAY,
17:23:44	20	I APOLOGIZE, YOUR HONOR. IT'S AWKWARD FOR ME. I'M
17:23:47	21	USED TO TELLING THE APPELLATE COURT WHY THE
17:23:50	22	DISTRICT COURT IS WRONG. IT'S NOT EVERY DAY WHEN I
17:23:51	23	TELL THE DISTRICT COURT WHY I THINK THE DISTRICT
17:23:53	24	COURT IS WRONG.
17:23:54	25	BUT I THINK THERE ARE DIFFICULT ISSUES

HERE WHICH, YOUR HONOR, I THINK THE LAW IS ON OUR 1 17:23:56 SIDE. 2 17:23:58 I MEAN, ONE OF THE THINGS THAT YOUR HONOR 3 17:23:59 17:24:00 4 SAID, I BELIEVE, OR AT LEAST HAS BEEN ARGUED, WAS THAT THERE WAS NO RELIANCE, YOU KNOW, FOR THE FRAUD 17:24:03 17:24:06 6 THEORY. WELL, YOUR HONOR, EVERY SINGLE CASE THAT 17:24:06 7 WE'VE BEEN ABLE TO FIND UNDER 29(B) SAYS RELIANCE 17:24:07 8 17:24:10 9 IS JUST NOT AN ISSUE. IT SAYS THAT YOU CAN VOID A CONTRACT IF THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE SECURITIES 17:24:13 10 17:24:16 11 LAWS. 17:24:17 12 NOW, FACEBOOK MAKES A BIG DEAL OUT OF 17:24:20 13 SAYING, OH, BUT YOU'RE SUPPOSED TO LOOK AT THE CONTRACT, NOT THE TRANSACTION. 17:24:22 14 17:24:24 15 I DON'T EVEN UNDERSTAND THE ARGUMENT. THE COURT: COUNSEL, I'M NOT -- I'M NOT 17:24:26 16 GOING TO ENTERTAIN AN ARGUMENT ABOUT THE ISSUES 17:24:29 17 17:24:32 18 THAT ARE ON APPEAL. THERE'S A STAY. 17:24:35 19 NOW, LET ME ASK THIS, THOUGH. MR. UNDERHILL: YES, YOUR HONOR. 17:24:36 20 17:24:37 21 THE COURT: IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT THE 17:24:41 22 REASON THIS SETTLEMENT WAS PUT TOGETHER WAS TO --WAS FOR BOTH SIDES TO BUY THEIR PEACE FROM 17:24:46 23 17:24:51 24 LITIGATION. 17:24:52 25 HOW DO I -- HOW DO I NOT DO VIOLENCE TO

1 17:24:57 17:25:01 2 17:25:02 17:25:04 4 17:25:09 5 17:25:12 6 17:25:15 7 17:25:19 8 17:25:20 9 17:25:23 10 17:25:24 11 17:25:28 12 17:25:29 13 17:25:30 14 17:25:31 15 17:25:34 16 17:25:36 17 17:25:38 18 17:25:39 19 17:25:41 20 17:25:43 21 17:25:45 22 17:25:46 23 17:25:50 24 17:25:53 25

THAT AND, AT THE SAME TIME, DO WHAT YOU'RE ASKING ME TO DO?

IN OTHER WORDS, ESSENTIALLY WOULDN'T I BE UNDOING THE SETTLEMENT TO SAY, BY THE VERY NATURE OF THIS ORDER, OKAY, NO, THE LITIGATION -- THE SETTLEMENT MEANT NOTHING IN TERMS OF RELEASES. GO AHEAD NOW AND GO OUT THERE AND CONTINUE TO, TO LITIGATE.

ESSENTIALLY FACEBOOK WAS SAYING, "FOR THIS CONSIDERATION, WE AGREE TO RESOLVE ALL LITIGATION."

HOW DO I ENFORCE THAT?

MR. UNDERHILL: RIGHT.

YOUR HONOR, I THINK THERE HAS TO BE SOME BALANCE HERE. I MEAN, IT IS ABSOLUTELY TRUE THAT WHEN PEOPLE WORK OUT A SETTLEMENT AND THEY HAVE SOME KIND OF A SIGNED DOCUMENT, YOU KNOW, THEY THINK THEY HAVE A SETTLEMENT.

BUT THE CASES ARE LEGION THAT SOMETIMES
THEY MAY THINK IT'S A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, BUT
IT'S NOT, AND IT GETS BLOWN UP.

AND PEOPLE NEED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY

TO BE ABLE TO LITIGATE IT WHEN THEY HAVE FRAUD

CLAIMS, OR WHEN THERE'S AN ALLEGATION THAT THE

TERMS ARE INSUFFICIENTLY VAGUE TO BE ENFORCED, AND

17:25:57	1	WE HAVE ADMISSIONS FROM FACEBOOK REFERRING TO IT AS
17:26:00	2	A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT. THEY'RE IN WRITING ON THAT.
17:26:03	3	THAT'S PART OF THE RECORD, YOUR HONOR.
17:26:05	4	AND SO THERE HAS TO BE SOME OPPORTUNITY
17:26:07	5	FOR SOMEONE TO CHALLENGE THAT AND, YOU KNOW, WE HAD
17:26:10	6	AN OPPORTUNITY WITH THE DISTRICT COURT.
17:26:12	7	BUT RESPECTFULLY, YOUR HONOR, I THINK THE
17:26:14	8	OPPORTUNITY TO CHALLENGE A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
17:26:16	9	ALSO INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO HAVE ANOTHER COURT LOOK
17:26:19	10	AT IT
17:26:20	11	THE COURT: I AGREE WITH YOU.
17:26:21	12	MR. UNDERHILL: AND DETERMINE IF THAT
17:26:22	13	WAS RIGHT.
17:26:22	14	THE COURT: LET ME INTERRUPT YOUR
17:26:24	15	ARGUMENT
17:26:25	16	MR. UNDERHILL: SURE.
17:26:25	17	THE COURT: JUST IN VIEW OF THE TIME.
17:26:27	18	I KNOW THAT THERE'S A LOT MORE TO BE SAID
17:26:30	19	AND I'LL HEAR FROM YOUR OPPONENT.
17:26:33	20	HAVE YOU TRIED THIS IDEA ON THEM THAT
17:26:35	21	YOU'VE JUST PUT TO THE COURT?
17:26:36	22	MR. UNDERHILL: I'VE TRIED VARIOUS IDEAS,
17:26:38	23	YOUR HONOR, WITH MR. FISHER, YOU KNOW, INVOLVED,
17:26:41	24	AND ALSO INDEPENDENTLY WITH MR. FISHER.
17:26:43	25	I'VE ATTEMPTED TO FLOAT THE IDEA THAT THE

17:26:45	1
17:26:48	2
17:26:51	3
17:26:52	4
17:26:53	5
17:26:56	6
17:26:57	7
17:27:00	8
17:27:02	9
17:27:05	10
17:27:08	11
17:27:09	12
17:27:10	13
17:27:12	14
17:27:16	15
17:27:18	16
17:27:20	17
17:27:23	18
17:27:24	19
17:27:25	20
17:27:27	21
17:27:28	22
17:27:30	23
17:27:31	24
17:27:33	25

SHARES WOULD BE TURNED OVER BUT WOULD BE KEPT WITH
THE SPECIAL MASTER, WOULD NOT BE RELINQUISHED
DURING THE APPEAL.

THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO MR. CHATTERJEE.

I FLOATED THE IDEA THAT WE TURN OVER THE COMPANY AND THAT HE KEEP IT SEPARATE.

THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO MR. CHATTERJEE.

I'VE -- I'VE FLOATED THE IDEA THAT HE
WOULD AGREE NOT TO IMPAIR OUR APPELLATE RIGHTS AND
NOT TO IMPAIR OUR ABILITY TO BRING A MALPRACTICE
CLAIM.

THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO MR. CHATTERJEE.

I MEAN, WHAT IT COMES DOWN TO -- AND I

DON'T BLAME HIM TOO MUCH, HE'S A LAWYER, HE'S JUST

TRYING TO WIN -- BUT HE'S GOT A DECISION THAT HE

LIKES AND IF HE CAN FORECLOSE THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOOKING AT IT, OF COURSE HE'S GOING TO TRY TO DO

THAT.

BUT I DON'T THINK IT'S FAIR HERE.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET ME HEAR --

MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, I'M JUST GOING TO START -- I'M NOT GOING TO SPEND A LOT OF TIME ON THIS.

FROM BOTH COUNSELS I'M GETTING A NUMBER
OF PERSONAL ATTACKS HERE. I'M NOT GOING TO GO

THERE, BUT I DON'T APPRECIATE IT. 1 17:27:36 I JUST -- WE HAVE A CODE OF 17:27:36 2 PROFESSIONALISM HERE AND I EXPECT PEOPLE TO FOLLOW 17:27:36 IT AND I'D ASK YOUR HONOR TO REMIND PEOPLE OF THAT. 17:27:40 4 THE COURT: I DIDN'T HEAR THAT KIND OF 17:27:42 5 ATTACK. I THINK THAT IT WAS RESPECTFUL, BUT IT IS 17:27:44 6 17:27:46 7 RESPECTFUL TAKING ISSUE WITH YOUR POSITION, NOT WITH YOU AS A COUNSEL, WHICH I SHOULD INDICATE I 17:27:49 8 HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF RESPECT FOR YOU AS A PERSON 17:27:51 9 WHO'S APPEARED BEFORE ME, AND SO FAR I HAVE A GREAT 17:27:53 10 DEAL OF RESPECT FOR ALL OF YOU WHO HAVE APPEARED. 17:27:57 11 17:28:00 12 SO GO AHEAD WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR 17:28:02 13 ARGUMENT. 17:28:02 14 MR. CHATTERJEE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I APPRECIATE THAT. 17:28:02 15 THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARGUMENT IS THIS: I 17:28:04 16 THINK YOUR HONOR IS RIGHT. WE NEGOTIATED A DEAL ON 17:28:06 17 17:28:09 18 FEBRUARY 22ND, AND THAT WAS A PEACE TREATY. 17:28:11 19 THERE WAS VALUE TO THE COMPANY THAT WE PURCHASED. IF WE DIDN'T WANT THE COMPANY, WE WOULD 17:28:13 20 17:28:15 21 HAVE JUST SIGNED RELEASES. 17:28:17 22 BUT WE DIDN'T. WE PURCHASED THE COMPANY, AND THERE'S A VALUE TO THE PEACE THAT WE SIGNED. 17:28:19 23 THE INDIVIDUALS, AS I SAID BEFORE, CHOSE 17:28:22 24 NOT TO OPPOSE THE MOTION TO ENFORCE. THE COMPANY

17:28:24 25

17:28:26 1 2 17:28:29 17:28:31 3 17:28:33 4 17:28:36 5 17:28:39 6 17:28:41 7 17:28:45 8 17:28:47 9 17:28:50 10 17:28:53 11 17:28:55 12 17:28:57 13 17:28:59 14 17:29:03 15 17:29:05 16 17:29:08 17 17:29:10 18 17:29:13 19 17:29:16 20 17:29:18 21

17:29:22 22

17:29:25 23

17:29:26 24

17:29:29 25

DID.

AND IF WE DIDN'T GET THE COMPANY THROUGH
THE RELEASE OF SHARES AND THEY WERE ABLE TO PROCEED
WITH MAJOR LITIGATION AGAINST THEIR FORMER LAW FIRM
WHICH THEY, BY THE WAY, INITIATED AFTER YOUR
JUDGMENT ENTERED, THEY INITIATED THE LAWSUIT IN THE
NEW YORK SUPREME COURT AFTER YOUR JUDGMENT ENTERED.

AND THEY -- THE DISPUTE STARTED BEFORE,

BUT THERE WAS AN ACTION IN THE NEW YORK SUPREME

COURT AFTERWARDS.

THE MALPRACTICE CLAIM THAT THEY WANT TO INITIATE, I DON'T KNOW IF THEY HAVE YET OR NOT, I HAVEN'T SEEN ANYTHING INDICATING THAT THEY HAVE, ALL OF THOSE THINGS ARE DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE VALUE OF THE COMPANY THAT WE PURCHASED.

AND FOR THEM TO COME IN HERE AND SAY,

"OH, FACEBOOK CAN DO THE DAY-TO-DAY CONTROL, THEY

CAN INVEST HEAVILY IN IT, THEY CAN BUILD A GREAT

COMPANY IF THEY'RE ABLE TO DO IT AND MAKE A GREAT

PROFIT OR DO SOMETHING TO MAKE THE COMPANY

OPERATIONAL, BUT IF THE NINTH CIRCUIT REVERSES,

THEN WE GET IT BACK AND WHATEVER THEY DID IS FOR

NAUGHT AND WE DON'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT

UNSCRAMBLING THAT EGG, " AND IF YOUR HONOR HAS

ALREADY ENTERED JUDGMENT SAYING THAT WE'RE RIGHT ON

17:29:31 1 17:29:34 2 17:29:36 3 17:29:37 4 17:29:41 5 17:29:43 6 17:29:45 7 17:29:48 8 17:29:51 9 17:29:51 10 17:29:53 11 17:29:56 12 17:29:59 13 17:30:00 14 17:30:03 15 17:30:05 16 17:30:07 17 17:30:09 18 17:30:11 19 17:30:14 20 17:30:16 21 17:30:18 22 17:30:21 23 17:30:25 24 17:30:28 25

THE ENFORCEMENT MOTION, FRANKLY, YOUR HONOR, IT'S SOMEWHAT ABSURD TO ARGUE THAT.

WE WANT THE VALUE OF WHAT WE PURCHASED, AND STAYING THE PROCEEDINGS IS, IS, IS TANTAMOUNT TO NOT RECOGNIZING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

THERE'S A PUBLIC INTEREST HERE IN

RECOGNIZING THESE AGREEMENTS THAT GETS IMPLICATED.

YOUR HONOR RECITED THAT YOURSELF AT THE JUDGMENT

HEARING.

THE ONE THING -- THE ONE OTHER POINT I
WANT TO MAKE IS, CANDIDLY, WE HAVE A BIG ISSUE WITH
THEM HAVING ANY DECISION MAKING OVER CONNECTU.

AND I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT THE LAWYERS.

I'M TALKING ABOUT THE WINKLEVOSS BROTHERS AND DIVYA

NARENDRA AND HOWARD WINKLEVOSS.

THEY INITIATED THE LITIGATION WITHOUT EVER CONSULTING ANYBODY AFTER THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED. THEY DON'T LIKE OUR COMPANY.

SO IF THINGS AREN'T GOING WELL IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT, THEY CAN DO WHATEVER THEY WANT.

THEY HAVE NOT PUT THE STOCK INTO GEORGE
FISHER'S HANDS PER YOUR HONOR'S ORDER. THAT WAS
DUE MONDAY, AND AT 2:15, GIVE OR TAKE A FEW
MINUTES, ON MONDAY, AFTER WE HAD PUT ALL OF OUR
CONSIDERATION IN, THAT SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF MONEY

17:30:31 1 17:30:35 2 17:30:37 17:30:39 4 17:30:39 17:30:42 6 17:30:44 7 17:30:47 8 17:30:48 9 17:30:51 10 17:30:53 11 17:30:54 12 17:31:01 13 17:31:04 14 17:31:05 15 17:31:10 16 17:31:16 17 17:31:20 18 17:31:24 19 17:31:31 20 17:31:38 21 17:31:44 22 17:31:47 23 17:31:51 24 17:31:55 25

AND THE SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF SHARES, THEY NOTIFIED US THAT THEY WERE GOING TO MAKE THE DECISION NOT TO SUBMIT IT TO HIM IN VIOLATION OF YOUR HONOR'S ORDER.

WHAT CONFIDENCE COULD WE POSSIBLY HAVE
THAT THEY ARE GOING TO PROTECT THE VALUE OF THAT
ASSET? IT'S SIMPLY NOT THERE. WE HAVE ZERO
CONFIDENCE IN THEM.

THE COURT: WELL, HERE'S THE DILEMMA THAT

I SEE. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE JUDGMENT WAS

PROPERLY ENTERED HERE.

BUT I ALSO BELIEVE THAT ANY JUDGMENT IS APPEALABLE TO A HIGHER COURT, ANY JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT.

AND I'M IN A CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE IT'S NOT

A MONEY JUDGMENT WHERE A BOND WOULD BE SUFFICIENT,

SO THAT I'M TRYING TO WALK MY WAY THROUGH A PROCESS

BY WHICH, EVEN IF I'M DISPOSED TO DENY THE STAY OF

EXECUTION, I WON'T DENY THE RIGHT TO APPEAL.

SO IF I UNDERSTAND THAT THE EXECUTION

COULD AMOUNT TO THE PLAINTIFF HERE TAKING THE

UNUSUAL STEP OF SAYING, "WELL, NOW AS THE

SHAREHOLDER, I TERMINATE THE APPEAL," THE EXECUTION

WOULD BE, IN EFFECT, A PLACING OF THE RIGHT OF

APPEAL, BUT DENYING THE RIGHT TO APPEAL. IT WOULD

_	_	
17:31:59 1	1	TERMINATE BY THE EXECUTION.
17:32:01 2	2	I'VE NEVER FACED THAT SITUATION BEFORE,
17:32:02	3	AND SO IT'S UNCHARTED WATER FOR ME.
17:32:05 4	4	AND SO THAT'S WHAT I NEED HELP WITH,
17:32:07 5	5	BECAUSE UNLESS YOU CONVINCE ME THAT THERE SHOULD BE
17:32:12 6	б	NO RIGHT TO APPEAL, I HAVE TO PUT THE OPPOSING
17:32:14 7	7	PARTY TO MY JUDGMENT IN A POSITION SO THEY CAN
17:32:17 8	8	CHALLENGE MY JUDGMENT.
17:32:19	9	MR. CHATTERJEE: SO, YOUR HONOR, I THINK
17:32:20 10	0	WHAT YOU'RE IDENTIFYING IS, IS THE CONFLICT THAT WE
17:32:22 11	1	HAVE HERE OF HARDSHIPS.
17:32:24 12	2	WE PURCHASED AN ASSET. WE WANT TO GET
17:32:26 13	3	VALUE FOR THE ASSET.
17:32:27 14	4	AND WE ALSO SOUGHT PEACE, AND THERE'S A
17:32:30 15	5	LOT OF HARDSHIP IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PEACE.
17:32:33 16	б	THEIR PURPORTED HARDSHIP IS ESSENTIALLY
17:32:35 17	7	THE RISK OF MOOTING AN APPEAL ON BEHALF OF
17:32:39 18	8	CONNECTU.
17:32:39 19	9	IF YOU ALLOW INTERVENTION, YOUR HONOR,
17:32:41 20	0	CANDIDLY, THAT MAY BECOME A NON-ISSUE DEPENDING ON
17:32:44 21	1	WHATEVER RIGHTS THE INDIVIDUALS HAVE UPON
17:32:47 22	2	INTERVENTION, BECAUSE AS YOUR HONOR NOTICED BEFORE,
17:32:49 23	3	THEY ESSENTIALLY ARE ASSERTING THE SAME SORTS OF
17:32:52 24	4	CLAIMS OF A THIRD PARTY COMPLAINANT.
17:32:54 25	5	NOW, WHEN YOU HAVE THESE TWO COMPETING

17:32:56 1 17:32:59 2 17:33:01 3 17:33:04 4 17:33:06 5 17:33:09 6 17:33:09 7 17:33:12 8 17:33:14 9 17:33:18 10 17:33:21 11 17:33:23 12 17:33:25 13 17:33:27 14 17:33:29 15 17:33:31 16 17:33:36 17 17:33:42 18 17:33:46 19 17:33:48 20 17:33:52 21 17:33:53 22 17:33:54 23 17:33:59 24 17:34:03 25

INTERESTS -- AND WE TALKED ABOUT THIS IN A FAIR

AMOUNT OF DETAIL IN OUR PAPERS -- THE VALUE OF A

STRATEGIC TRANSACTION, OR OF A CORPORATE

TRANSACTION, IS SOMETHING THAT IS LIMITED IN TIME,

AND THAT IS GIVEN A PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE

HARM.

THE MOOTNESS ON APPEAL ISSUE, THERE'S A SPLIT IN THE, IN THE COURTS OVER WHETHER THAT CONSTITUTES IRREPARABLE HARM OR NOT, BUT THE MAJORITY OF THE COURTS FIND THAT THAT ISN'T IRREPARABLE HARM.

AND, YOUR HONOR, AGAIN, THEY KNEW THIS

COMING INTO THE MOTION TO ENFORCE HEARING WHEN THE

INDIVIDUALS DIDN'T OPPOSE THAT WE WERE GOING TO ASK

FOR THE COMPANY, BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT WE WERE ASKING

FOR IN THE MOTION TO ENFORCE.

THE COURT: DO YOU SEE -- WELL, I -- I
HEAR THAT AS MORE OF AN ARGUMENT TO DENY THE MOTION
TO INTERVENE, AND THAT PART I UNDERSTAND YOUR
POSITION ON. I'M NOT SURE I'LL GO ALONG WITH IT,
BUT I UNDERSTAND IT.

BUT I DIDN'T HEAR YOU RESPOND TO

MR. UNDERHILL'S CONCERN THAT IF I DON'T STAY

ENFORCEMENT AND I ORDER ENFORCEMENT, AND NOT TO BE

CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE COURT, THAT GO AHEAD AND COMPLY

1 17:34:07 17:34:09 2 17:34:11 3 17:34:14 4 17:34:18 5 17:34:23 6 17:34:25 7 17:34:26 8 17:34:28 9 17:34:30 10 17:34:32 11 17:34:35 12 17:34:35 13 17:34:37 14 17:34:40 15 17:34:42 16 17:34:44 17 17:34:46 18 17:34:48 19 17:34:50 20 17:34:53 21 17:34:54 22 17:34:56 23 17:34:58 24 17:35:00 25

AND TURN OVER THE SHARES AND THERE'S THIS EXCHANGE,
THAT WOULD PUT FACEBOOK IN A POSITION WHERE IT
COULD SAY, "AS CONNECTU, WE NOW DETERMINE TO
ABANDON THE APPEAL," AND EFFECTIVELY DENY TO THAT
LITIGANT THE RIGHT TO QUESTION MY JUDGMENT.

HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THAT?

MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, I DON'T
THINK THERE'S ANY -- I DON'T THINK MR. UNDERHILL'S
MADE ANY SECRET ABOUT WHAT HE'S GOING TO DO IF YOU
ORDER ENFORCEMENT OF THE ORDER YOU'RE ALREADY
ENFORCING AND THEY HAVE TO HAND OVER THE SHARES OF
THE COMPANY.

BY THE WAY, THEY'RE NOT EVEN IN GEORGE
FISHER'S HANDS YET. THERE'S ANOTHER STEP WHERE HE
HAS TO SEEK A COURT ORDER FROM YOU TO ALLOW RELEASE
OF IT.

BUT LET'S ASSUME THAT THAT HAPPENED. I'M

FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT MR. UNDERHILL IS GOING TO BE

RUNNING TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT SEEKING A STAY OF

EXECUTION OF THAT JUDGMENT AND SEEKING NINTH

CIRCUIT INTERVENTION ON THAT.

AND SO, YOU KNOW, EITHER WAY IT'S GOING TO BE GOING TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT FOR RESOLUTION.

THE COURT: LET ME GO BACK TO YOU,

MR. UNDERHILL, BECAUSE I EXPECTED THAT THAT WOULD

BE THE ANSWER, AND THAT IS THIS. 17:35:02 1 THIS IS SORT OF LIKE, AS I SAID, AN 17:35:04 2 INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, WHICH MEANS THAT I HAVE TO BE 17:35:07 3 CONVINCED TO STAY THIS, THAT THERE'S A LIKELIHOOD 17:35:10 4 OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS. 17:35:13 5 MR. UNDERHILL: RIGHT. 17:35:15 6 17:35:16 7 THE COURT: AND IF I AM CONFIDENT, AS I AM, IN MY JUDGMENT, WHAT WOULD BE THE BASIS FOR 17:35:18 8 THIS COURT STAYING EXECUTION? 17:35:23 9 MR. UNDERHILL: RIGHT. 17:35:25 10 THE COURT: AS OPPOSED TO YOUR SEEKING 17:35:25 11 17:35:27 12 SUCH A STAY FROM THE CIRCUIT, WHICH MIGHT TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE 17:35:30 13 17:35:33 14 MERITS? 17:35:34 15 MR. UNDERHILL: YOUR HONOR, WITH THE COURT'S INDULGENCE, THEN, IN RESPONSE TO THAT 17:35:35 16 QUESTION, I WOULD LIKE TO SPEND FIVE MINUTES ON THE 17:35:38 17 17:35:41 18 LAW. 17:35:41 19 THE COURT: YOU'VE GOT FIVE MINUTES AND THEN I'M GOING TO BRING THIS TO A CLOSE VERY 17:35:42 20 17:35:44 21 QUICKLY IN DEFERENCE TO THE PROMISE I MADE TO MY 17:35:47 22 STAFF. 17:35:47 23 MR. UNDERHILL: SURE, YOUR HONOR. 17:35:48 24 IN ADDITION TO WEDDINGTON, WHICH WE BRIEFED AND I'M NOT GOING TO TALK ABOUT BECAUSE I'M 17:35:51 25

17:35:53 1 17:35:56 2 17:35:58 3 17:35:58 4 17:36:01 5 17:36:05 6 17:36:09 7 17:36:17 8 17:36:18 9 17:36:20 10 17:36:23 11 17:36:27 12 17:36:30 13 17:36:33 14 17:36:34 15 17:36:36 16 17:36:38 17 17:36:42 18 17:36:45 19 17:36:49 20 17:36:53 21 17:36:55 22 17:36:57 23 17:36:58 24

17:37:01 25

VERY MINDFUL WHAT OF YOU JUST SAID, I WOULD LIKE,
YOUR HONOR, TO GIVE YOU TWO MORE CASES WHICH WE
THINK FOLLOW THE SAME PROPOSITION.

ONE IS IN RE: IMPERIAL CREDIT INDUSTRIES,

527 F.3D 959, IT'S A NINTH CIRCUIT CASE; AND THE

OTHER ONE IS WOLFE V. SUPERIOR COURT, 8 CALIFORNIA

REPORTER 3D 649, AT PAGES 655 TO 656, AND THAT'S

THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEALS.

IN WOLFE, THE COURT SAID, "WE HOLD THAT

IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR A TRIAL COURT TO REFUSE

TO CONSIDER SUCH EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF

THE TRIAL COURT'S OWN CONCLUSION THAT THE LANGUAGE

OF THE CONTRACT APPEARS TO BE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS

ON ITS FACE."

AND, YOUR HONOR, THAT'S WHAT WE THINK
HAPPENED HERE. I THINK YOUR HONOR CONCLUDED THAT
THE TERM SHEET WAS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS ON ITS
FACE, DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT WE HAD SUBMITTED,
INCLUDING THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF DONNA HITSCHERICH
THAT IT WAS INDEED UNCLEAR AS TO WHETHER IT WAS
SUPPOSED TO BE A MERGER OR A STOCK PURCHASE.

INDEED, IN THEIR OWN FILING, IN THEIR

ORIGINAL FILING WITH THE COURT WHERE THEY ASKED THE

COURT TO ENFORCE IT, THEY VARIOUSLY IN THEIR

DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IT'S A MERGER OR A STOCK

17:37:04 1 17:37:05 2 17:37:07 3 17:37:10 4 17:37:13 5 17:37:15 6 17:37:19 7 17:37:22 8 17:37:24 9 17:37:26 10 17:37:29 11 17:37:32 12 17:37:35 13 17:37:36 14 17:37:39 15 17:37:44 16 17:37:46 17 17:37:50 18 17:37:51 19 17:37:53 20

17:37:57 21

17:37:57 22

17:38:00 23

17:38:04 24

17:38:06 25

PURCHASE.

WOLFE CLEARLY SAYS THAT YOU ARE ALLOWED TO LOOK, AND INDEED IN THIS CASE, THE COURT ERRED BY NOT LOOKING AT THE SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.

IN LOOKING AT THE NINTH CIRCUIT LAW THAT I JUST GAVE YOU, THE COURT SAID, "MUTUAL INTENT IS DETERMINED BY THE WORD 'USED' IN THE AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF SUCH OBJECTIVE MATTERS AS THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE PARTIES NEGOTIATED OR ENTERED INTO THE CONTRACT, THE OBJECT, NATURE, AND SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT, AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES."

SO, YOUR HONOR, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WAS ERROR, UNDER CLEAR NINTH CIRCUIT AND CALIFORNIA LAW, FOR THE COURT TO LOOK AT THE FOUR CORNERS AND SAY, "LOOK, IT'S CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS TO ME. I'M GOING TO ENFORCE IT THIS WAY."

WITH RESPECT TO THE FRAUD CLAIM, YOUR HONOR, THE CASE LAW IS UNDISPUTED, AS LONG -- AS FAR AS WE KNOW.

WE FOUND TWO CASES, TWO APPELLATE CASES, THAT SAY NO RELIANCE IS REQUIRED UNDER 29(B) WHEN YOU'RE ALLEGING SECURITIES FRAUD.

1 17:38:09 17:38:12 2 17:38:14 3 17:38:18 4 17:38:21 5 17:38:21 6 17:38:23 7 17:38:25 17:38:29 9 17:38:31 10 17:38:33 11 17:38:35 12 17:38:37 13 17:38:41 14 17:38:44 15 17:38:46 16 17:38:50 17 17:38:53 18 17:38:57 19 17:38:59 20 17:39:03 21 17:39:05 22 17:39:08 23 17:39:11 24

17:39:12 25

CASE. THAT SEEMS TO BE A VERY IMPORTANT CASE. I
WOULD RESPECTFULLY ASK, YOUR HONOR, IF PERHAPS
YOU'D TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT IT. PETRO-VENTURES WAS
A CASE WHERE A RELEASE WAS HELD TO BAR A SECURITIES
FRAUD CLAIM.

WE HAVE NEVER SAID THAT YOU CAN'T RELEASE
A SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIM.

THE DIFFERENCE, HOWEVER, IS THAT IN

PETRO-VENTURES, THEY WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT FRAUD

IN THE INDUCEMENT. THAT WAS NOT A SITUATION WHERE

SOMEONE SAYS, "HERE'S THE SECURITIES. IN THE SAME

CONTRACT THAT I'M GIVING YOU THE SECURITIES, I WANT

YOU TO SIGN A RELEASE THAT'S GOING TO INDEMNIFY ME,

OR PROTECT ME, FROM ANY SORT OF FRAUD CLAIM."

THAT SORT OF WAIVER, YOU KNOW, IN THE SAME CONTRACT, "HERE'S THE SECURITIES, AND BY THE WAY, I WANT YOU TO RELEASE ME IF I'M DEFRAUDING YOU RIGHT NOW," THAT IS NON-WAIVABLE, YOUR HONOR.

THAT'S SECTION 29(A) OF THE SECURITIES

EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934. CONGRESS PUT THAT IN THERE

TO MAKE SURE THAT SOMEBODY DRAFTING, YOU KNOW,

CONTRACTS WHERE YOU'RE SELLING SECURITIES CAN'T

STICK SOMETHING IN THERE THAT SAYS, "OH, YOU'RE

WAIVING ANY SORT OF FRAUD CLAIM."

THAT, YOUR HONOR, IS WHY WE ARE

17:39:13 1	COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM <u>PETRO-VENTURES</u> . WE ARE A
17:39:16 2	FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CASE.
17:39:18 3	OUR ALLEGATION, AND OBVIOUSLY THEY DENY
17:39:20 4	IT, BUT OUR ALLEGATION IS THAT WE WERE DEFRAUDED,
17:39:23 5	WE WERE DEFRAUDED INTO ENTERING INTO THE SETTLEMENT
17:39:25 6	AGREEMENT.
17:39:26 7	THAT MAKES US COMPLETELY DIFFERENT, YOUR
17:39:28 8	HONOR, FROM <u>PETRO-VENTURES</u> .
17:39:31 9	THE THE AND I DO JUST WANT TO
17:39:33 10	UNDERSCORE, THEY MAKE A BIG DEAL OUT OF 29(B).
17:39:36 11	THEY SAY IT APPLIES TO CONTRACTS, NOT TRANSACTIONS.
17:39:38 12	I'M NOT EVEN SURE I UNDERSTAND IT.
17:39:40 13	BUT IF IT DOES APPLY TO CONTRACTS, WHICH
17:39:44 14	IS WHAT THEY SAY IT DOES, THAT'S WHAT WE'RE LOOKING
17:39:47 15	FOR HERE. WE ARE LOOKING TO AVOID THE EXACT
17:39:50 16	CONTRACT THAT WE BELIEVE WE WERE DEFRAUDED INTO
17:39:52 17	ENTERING INTO.
17:39:53 18	AND, YOUR HONOR, I JUST I DON'T SEE
17:39:55 19	HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT COULD SEE IT DIFFERENTLY. I
17:39:59 20	SAY THAT RESPECTFULLY, YOUR HONOR.
17:40:00 21	AT THE VERY LEAST, THERE ARE, YOU KNOW,
17:40:03 22	SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW HERE THAT NEED TO BE
17:40:06 23	ADDRESSED BY THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
17:40:08 24	I THINK FUNCTIONALLY WHAT THE COURT HAS
17:40:10 25	DONE IS CREATED A SETTLEMENT EXCEPTION TO

17:40:15 1 2 17:40:18 17:40:23 17:40:26 4 17:40:29 5 17:40:32 6 17:40:33 7 17:40:36 8 17:40:39 9 17:40:42 10 17:40:44 11 17:40:45 12 17:40:48 13 17:40:51 14 17:40:52 15 17:40:57 16 17:40:59 17 17:41:00 18 17:41:03 19 17:41:07 20 17:41:08 21 17:41:10 22 17:41:12 23 17:41:15 24 17:41:18 25

SECURITIES FRAUD. IT'S THE IDEA THAT IF YOU HAVE A CONTRACT AND THERE'S SECURITIES FRAUD, YOU CAN'T REMEDY IT IF IT'S A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

OR -- OR STATED -- AND I DO WANT TO BE FAIR. PERHAPS I SHOULD STATE IT DIFFERENTLY.

I'M NOT SURE IF IT'S A SETTLEMENT

EXCEPTION TO SECURITIES FRAUD OR IF IT'S LIKE A

MEDIATION EXCEPTION TO SECURITIES FRAUD, THAT IF

THERE'S A MEDIATION INVOLVED, THAT IT SOMEHOW

OBVIATES THE FRAUD.

AND, YOUR HONOR, EVEN IF THE COURT

BELIEVED THAT WERE THE CORRECT DIRECTION OF THE

LAW, I MEAN, THAT'S CONTRARY TO WHAT CONGRESS HAS

DECREED.

CONGRESS HAS SAID THAT YOU CAN VOID A, A CONTRACT THAT IS IN VIOLATION OF THE SECURITIES LAWS.

WE DID FIND A CASE, YOUR HONOR, WHEN YOU REQUESTED IT, THAT DEALT WITH SETTING ASIDE A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

IN THAT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, THERE WERE VIOLATIONS OF MARGIN REQUIREMENTS AND, NONETHELESS, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SET ASIDE THE, THE CONTRACT, YOU KNOW, WHICH WAS A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. THAT WAS PEARLSTEIN, YOUR HONOR.

17:41:19 1 17:41:21 2 17:41:24 3 17:41:26 4 17:41:26 5 17:41:29 6 17:41:32 7 17:41:35 8 17:41:37 9 17:41:40 10 17:41:42 11 17:41:43 12 17:41:45 13 17:41:49 14 17:41:51 15 17:41:54 16 17:41:57 17 17:42:00 18 17:42:01 19 17:42:03 20 17:42:08 21 17:42:10 22 17:42:12 23 17:42:15 24 17:42:20 25

NOW, THE COURT -- THE OTHER SIDE HAS NOTED THAT THAT WAS OVERRULED. IT WAS, BUT IT WAS ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS.

EXCUSE ME.

IT WAS NOT ON THE 29(B) GROUND.

BUT THAT CASE UNAMBIGUOUSLY HELD THAT

UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN A

VIOLATION OF THE MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, BECAUSE THE

MARGIN REQUIREMENT WAS A -- IS A VIOLATION OF

FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, THAT THE SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT WAS SET ASIDE.

NOW, IN THE COURT'S OPINION, THE COURT CORRECTLY NOTED THAT THAT WAS MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, NOT FRAUD, AND THAT'S TRUE, YOUR HONOR.

BUT THE STATUTE DOESN'T DISTINGUISH

WHATSOEVER BETWEEN FRAUD AND MARGIN REQUIREMENTS.

IT SAYS IF YOU VIOLATE THE SECURITIES LAWS, YOU CAN

VOID THE CONTRACT.

SO, I MEAN, AT THE VERY LEAST, YOUR HONOR, I THINK WE HAVE EXTREMELY WEIGHTY ARGUMENTS HERE.

THERE IS ALSO THE IDEA IN THE FEDERAL

RULES GOVERNING MEDIATION HERE IN THIS COURT THAT

UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT SHOULD PIERCE

THE MEDIATION VEIL, AND WE ARGUED IN OUR PAPERS WHY

17:42:25 1 17:42:29 2 17:42:31 3 17:42:33 4 17:42:37 5 17:42:40 6 17:42:44 7 17:42:48 8 17:42:52 9 17:42:57 10 17:42:59 11 17:43:01 12 17:43:04 13 17:43:09 14 17:43:11 15 17:43:12 16 17:43:14 17 17:43:17 18 17:43:21 19 17:43:25 20 17:43:28 21 17:43:31 22 17:43:33 23 17:43:35 24 17:43:37 25

WE THOUGHT THE MEDIATION VEIL SHOULD BE PIERCED HERE.

AND, AGAIN, UNLESS I MISUNDERSTOOD THE

COURT'S OPINION, YOUR HONOR, I THINK -- AT LEAST

THE OPINION DOES NOT REFLECT, IN ADDRESSING A

CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS THAT WOULD

LEAD ONE TO PIERCE THE MEDIATION VEIL, EVEN THOUGH

THE FEDERAL RULES OF THIS DISTRICT SPECIFICALLY DO

ALLOW FOR EXCEPTIONS IN, IN PIERCING MEDIATION.

SO AT THE END OF -- AND ONE LAST ISSUE.

OPPOSING COUNSEL JUST REFERRED TO THIS
MOOTNESS ISSUE AND SAID THE COURTS ARE SPLIT ON
WHETHER OR NOT DENYING SOMEONE AN APPEAL IS ENOUGH
TO BE IRREPARABLE HARM.

AND, YOUR HONOR, AGAIN, WITH ALL RESPECT, THAT'S JUST PLAIN WRONG.

I MEAN, WE HAVE FOUND SEVERAL ARTICLE III
DECISIONS THAT FLATLY HOLD THAT IF YOU'RE GOING TO
BE DENIED YOUR APPEAL, THAT IS IRREPARABLE HARM.
WE HAVE THREE OF THEM. THERE'S TWO IN THE BRIEF
AND I CAN GIVE ONE MORE CITATION ON IT. THOSE ARE
THE ONLY ONES WE FOUND.

WHEN COUNSEL SAYS THERE'S SOME SPLIT OF
AUTHORITY, WHAT HE'S REFERRING TO ARE BANKRUPTCY
COURTS, AND IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS -- AND EVEN

17:43:39 1 2 17:43:42 3 17:43:46 17:43:48 4 17:43:50 17:43:52 6 17:43:55 7 17:43:59 8 17:44:02 9 17:44:05 10 17:44:09 11 17:44:11 12 17:44:14 13 17:44:16 14 17:44:21 15 17:44:24 16 17:44:27 17 17:44:29 18 17:44:31 19 17:44:36 20 17:44:39 21 17:44:44 22 17:44:44 23 17:44:50 24

17:44:53 25

THERE THERE'S A SPLIT, IN BANKRUPTCY COURTS -- WHEN THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT MOOTNESS, THEY'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL MOOTNESS. THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT EQUITABLE MOOTNESS.

AND THIS IS A FEATURE WHICH IS COMPLETELY UNIQUE TO BANKRUPTCY LAW. IT'S THE WHOLE IDEA THAT ONE GUY SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CHALLENGE ON APPEAL ONE TRANSACTION IF IT'S GOING TO BE THE THREAD THAT PULLS APART, YOU KNOW, AN ENTIRE REORGANIZATION INVOLVING 200, YOU KNOW, COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUALS.

SO IN THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT, YES, THERE ARE SOME CASES, AND AT LEAST ONE COURT SAID IT WAS THE MAJORITY, ALTHOUGH IT SEEMED TO ME FROM READING THE CASE IT LOOKED PRETTY CLOSE, THAT MOOTNESS, BUT NOT CONSTITUTIONAL MOOTNESS, IT'S THIS EQUITABLE MOOTNESS, WOULD NOT BE IRREPARABLE HARM.

AND YOUR HONOR, IF YOU'RE INTERESTED, I
CAN CERTAINLY GIVE YOU SOME CASES ON THIS. THE
CASES THAT -- THE ARTICLE III CASES THAT SAY IT IS
IRREPARABLE HARM WE CITED IN OUR MOTION FOR A STAY
AT PAGES 5 AND 7. ANOTHER ONE IS A FIRST CIRCUIT
CASE, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL VERSUS FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION AT 595 F.2D 889 AT 890.

NOW, THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS AND THE DISCUSSION OF THESE POLICY REASONS AND THIS IDEA

1 17:44:55 2 17:44:58 17:45:02 3 17:45:05 4 17:45:10 17:45:17 6 17:45:19 7 17:45:22 8 17:45:25 9 17:45:29 10 17:45:31 11 17:45:35 12 17:45:38 13 17:45:43 14 17:45:46 15 17:45:49 16 17:45:52 17 17:45:53 18 17:45:55 19 17:45:59 20 17:46:01 21

17:46:03 22

17:46:08 23

17:46:11 24

17:46:14 25

THAT IN BANKRUPTCY COURT, MOOTNESS IS A VERY, VERY
DIFFERENT THING THAN IT IS IN ARTICLE III COURTS, I
WOULD REFER THE COURT TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
DECISION, 2007, IN SUTER, S-U-T-E-R, VERSUS
GOEDERT, 504 F.3D 982, AND IT'S AT PAGE 986.

THINK THROUGH, YOU KNOW, HOW IS THERE SOME WAY THAT
WE CAN PRESERVE OUR APPEAL AND YET FACEBOOK GETS
WHATEVER BENEFIT THEY NOW ALLEGE IS A RESULT OF
GETTING THE COMPANY, THERE IS A DOCTRINE, IT'S
ACTUALLY MENTIONED IN FACEBOOK'S PAPERS, CALLED
DOMINIX LITIS, WHICH IS THE IDEA THAT IF ONE SIDE
CONTROLS BOTH COMPANIES AND IT -- AND IT'S FORMAL
AND ACTUAL CONTROL, I THINK IS THE LANGUAGE, THAT
IT'S MOOT, YOU KNOW, THE FED CIRCUIT, OR THE
APPELLATE COURTS WILL GET RID OF IT ON MOOTNESS
GROUNDS.

SO MY CONCERN, WHAT I DO WANT TO BE CLEAR ABOUT HERE, IS THAT IF THEY -- IF WE TURNED IT OVER TO FACEBOOK, EVEN IF THEY AGREED TO KEEP IT SEPARATE, I THINK THERE WOULD BE A SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY'RE EVEN OWNING IT, THAT IS, THE COMPANY AS DISTINCT FROM BEING ABLE TO OPERATE IT, WOULD TRIGGER THIS DOCTRINE OF DOMINIX LITIS.

17:46:19	1
17:46:21	2
17:46:26	3
17:46:29	4
17:46:32	5
17:46:34	6
17:46:38	7
17:46:41	8
17:46:43	9
17:46:46	10
17:46:50	11
17:46:53	12
17:46:56	13
17:46:59	14
17:47:01	15
17:47:03	16
17:47:05	17
17:47:08	18
17:47:08	19
17:47:10	20
17:47:14	21
17:47:16	22
17:47:18	23
17:47:20	24
17:47:24	25

I'D ALSO LIKE TO MAKE ONE LAST POINT, AND IT'S THIS IDEA THAT WE SOMEHOW, YOU KNOW, ADVISED THEM FOR THE FIRST TIME AT 2:14 OR WHATEVER IT WAS, I THINK THAT'S JUST OVER THE TOP.

AND I'M NOT SOMEONE THAT GETS OFFENDED EASILY, BUT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, ALL THE WAY BACK AT ORAL ARGUMENT ON JULY 2, MY PARTNER, DAVID BARRETT, MADE THE POINT THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR SOME WAY TO HOLD THE STATUS QUO.

I HAVE WORKED BOTH INDIVIDUALLY WITH MR. FISHER, AND IN CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. CHATTERJEE ON THE LINE WHEN MR. FISHER WAS THERE TO TRY TO REACH SOME KIND OF A, YOU KNOW, ACCOMMODATION WHERE WE COULD GO FORWARD.

I HAVE NEVER IN MY LIFE, YOUR HONOR, BEEN IN CONTEMPT OF A COURT ORDER, AND IT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT I'M GOOD AT DOING OR COMFORTABLE AT DOING.

BUT I'VE GOT TO FIGURE OUT SOME WAY THAT WE GET A, AN APPEAL TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

ONE OF THE THINGS THAT I'D LIKE TO BRIEFLY TOUCH ON IS THE PRIOR MOTION BECAUSE I THINK IT DIRECTLY RELATES HERE.

I DO BELIEVE MR. CHATTERJEE'S STRATEGY IS, YOU KNOW, IF THE INDIVIDUALS HAVE TO COME IN,

1 17:47:27 2 17:47:33 17:47:35 17:47:38 4 17:47:40 17:47:42 6 17:47:44 7 17:47:48 8 17:47:50 9 17:47:53 10 17:47:56 11 17:47:56 12 17:47:58 13 17:48:01 14 17:48:03 15 17:48:05 16 17:48:07 17 17:48:09 18 17:48:13 19 17:48:16 20 17:48:18 21 17:48:21 22 17:48:24 23

17:48:28 24

17:48:29 25

THAT THEIR, THEIR ABILITY IS GOING TO BE SO

CIRCUMSCRIBED THAT BY THE TIME THEY GET TO THE

NINTH CIRCUIT, MR. CHATTERJEE IS GOING TO BE

ARGUING THAT THEY SET IT OUT IN THE DISTRICT COURT,

SO THEREFORE, THEY'RE NOT ALLOWED TO CHALLENGE ALL

THESE ISSUES I'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT, THIS IDEA OF

HOW YOU INTERPRET 29(A), HOW YOU INTERPRET 29(B),

THE IDEA OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT LAW AND THE

CALIFORNIA REPORTER DECISION ABOUT HOW THE JUDGE IS

REQUIRED TO LOOK BEYOND THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE

AGREEMENT.

MY CONCERN IS, YOU KNOW, HIS ARGUMENT IS

GOING -- THEY DON'T EVEN GET TO MAKE THOSE

ARGUMENTS. THEY CAN ARGUE ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THE

JUDGMENT APPLIES TO THEM, BUT THEY'RE NOT GOING TO

GET TO DO THE UNDERLYING MERITS.

AND THEN, IF YOU CAN FIGURE OUT A WAY TO KEEP CONNECTU FROM BEING ABLE TO RAISE THOSE THINGS AT THE NINTH CIRCUIT, HE WILL HAVE WON BY DEFAULT.

AND I'M TRYING TO PREVENT THAT, YOUR HONOR. MY CLIENT IS OPEN TO ANYTHING TO PRESERVE A REAL APPEAL TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT WHERE WE CAN RAISE WHAT WE THINK ARE EXTREMELY STRONG LEGAL ARGUMENTS.

THAT'S ALL I HAVE, YOUR HONOR.

MR. O'SHEA: YOUR HONOR, YOUR HONOR --

1 17:48:31 17:48:32 2 17:48:34 3 17:48:38 4 17:48:38 5 17:48:40 6 17:48:42 7 17:48:43 8 17:48:47 9 17:48:50 10 17:48:52 11 17:48:54 12 17:48:56 13 17:48:58 14 17:49:01 15 17:49:02 16 17:49:05 17 17:49:08 18 17:49:11 19 17:49:11 20 17:49:14 21 17:49:17 22 17:49:18 23 17:49:19 24

17:49:21 25

OH, I'M SORRY.

YOUR HONOR, ON BEHALF OF THE INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS, WE JOIN IN THE MOTION FOR A STAY.

THE COURT: THANK YOU.

MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, PAGE 11 OF
YOUR ORDER, THIS IS WHAT YOU SAID. "WITHOUT A
SHOWING BY DEFENDANTS OF A MATERIAL
MISREPRESENTATION OR OMISSION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,
THE COURT FINDS NO BASIS TO DECLINE ENFORCEMENT."

THAT'S A FACTUAL FINDING, YOUR HONOR.

THERE'S NO -- THERE'S NO LEGAL, SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW THERE ON THE MERITS.

WE CAN GO THROUGH THE REST OF WHAT WE PUT IN OUR BRIEF, BUT IT'S GETTING LATE IN THE DAY AND I DON'T WANT TO SPEND TIME ON THAT.

ON THE HARM ISSUE, I'LL JUST POINT YOUR
HONOR TO PAGES 14 AND 15 OF OUR BRIEF. WE CITE ALL
THE CASES RELATED TO THIS MOOTNESS ISSUE WE'RE
DISCUSSING.

WE ARE GROSSLY OVER TIME WITH WHAT YOUR
HONOR HAD ASKED, SO I DON'T WANT TO SPEND MORE TIME
UNLESS THERE'S A QUESTION THE COURT WOULD LIKE US
TO ADDRESS.

THE COURT: NO. I WAS GOING TO PUT A QUESTION TO MR. FISHER, SINCE I HAVE THE BENEFIT OF

HIS PRESENCE, AND THEN I WANT TO TAKE THIS UNDER 1 17:49:23 SUBMISSION AND DECIDE WHAT TO DO. 17:49:28 2 BUT ONE OF THE SUGGESTIONS THAT I'VE HAD 17:49:32 3 17:49:37 4 IS THAT YOU BE PUT IN A POSITION WHERE YOU'RE 17:49:42 5 OPERATING THIS COMPANY. 17:49:44 6 THAT'S INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT I THINK IS 17:49:47 7 ULTIMATELY TO THE BENEFIT OF THE JUDGMENT THAT'S 17:49:50 8 BEEN ENTERED. BUT IS THAT -- THAT'S A TASK THAT I 17:49:52 9 HAVEN'T ASSIGNED TO YOU AT THIS POINT. 17:49:54 10 17:49:56 11 WHAT'S YOUR COMMENT ON YOUR WILLINGNESS 17:49:58 12 TO UNDERTAKE THAT SHOULD THE COURT FIND THAT TO BE 17:50:02 13 EFFICACIOUS? MR. FISHER: WELL, BASED UPON 17:50:04 14 MR. UNDERHILL'S REPRESENTATION OF WHAT IT IS, I 17:50:05 15 17:50:07 16 DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM DOING THAT OR, YOU KNOW, PURSUANT TO COURT ORDERS OR WITH THE CONSENT OF THE 17:50:10 17 17:50:14 18 PARTIES. 17:50:15 19 I THINK THE MAIN POINT THERE, AND IT'S ONE THAT WE'VE COME TO LOGGERHEADS IN TRYING TO 17:50:17 20 17:50:21 21 REACH AN AGREEMENT, IS OPERATING AN EXISTING COMPANY VERSUS CHANGES OR WHATEVER. THAT'S ONE 17:50:25 22 17:50:27 23 ELEMENT. BUT THEN HAVING TO DO WITH THE RIGHT TO 17:50:28 24 17:50:29 25 APPEAL AND HAVING TO DO WITH THE MALPRACTICE CASE,

17:50:32	1
17:50:34	2
17:50:38	3
17:50:41	4
17:50:44	5
17:50:49	6
17:50:50	7
17:50:53	8
17:50:56	9
17:50:59	10
17:51:01	11
17:51:02	12
17:51:05	13
17:51:09	14
17:51:10	15
17:51:13	16
17:51:15	17
17:51:18	18
17:51:20	19
17:51:23	20
17:51:25	21
17:51:28	22
17:51:32	23
17:51:33	24
17:51:34	25

YOU KNOW, THOSE ARE SEPARATE. IT'S MORE OF SEPARATION OF A BUSINESS THAN THE CORPORATE ENTITY.

SO, YOU KNOW -- AND WE EXPLORED, OR TRIED TO EXPLORE, SOME WAYS OF, OF DEALING WITH, WITH THE RIGHT TO APPEAL OR WITH THE MALPRACTICE CASE AND WE DIDN'T GET VERY FAR.

SO I CAN'T HOLD OUT A WHOLE LOT OF ENCOURAGEMENT ON WAYS TO DEAL WITH THOSE. WE COME TO THE SAME POSITIONS THAT WE ARE IN NOW AS TO WHETHER THERE IS A RIGHT TO APPEAL OR NOT.

MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR, IF THE

COMPANY WERE -- THE FIRST STEP IS OBVIOUSLY TO GET

THE SHARES INTO MR. FISHER'S HANDS, AND THAT, THAT

NEEDS TO HAPPEN SOMEHOW.

BUT IF HE WERE TO OPERATE THE COMPANY, I
THINK THERE WOULD STILL BE A PRETTY SUBSTANTIAL
BOND NECESSARY BECAUSE WE WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO GET
THE VALUE THAT WE'VE PAID FOR.

WHETHER IT'S IN HIS HANDS OR IN THEIRS, WE'RE STILL NOT GETTING THE VALUE OF WHAT WE PAID FOR THROUGH THE SETTLEMENT.

SO I'M NOT SURE -- FROM THAT PERSPECTIVE,

I ALSO SEE A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM.

THE COURT: DID I UNDERSTAND YOU TO SAY
THAT CONNECTU HAS INITIATED THIS LITIGATION, THIS

17:51:37	1	MALPRACTICE CASE, OR IS THAT DONE BY THE
17:51:40	2	INDIVIDUALS ONLY?
17:51:41	3	MR. CHATTERJEE: BOTH, YOUR HONOR.
17:51:42	4	MR. O'SHEA CURRENTLY REPRESENTS CONNECTU AGAINST
17:51:45	5	THE AGAINST THE QUINN, EMANUEL FIRM.
17:51:47	6	MR. O'SHEA: MAY I SPEAK TO THAT, JUDGE?
17:51:49	7	FIRST OF ALL, IT'S NOT TRUE.
17:51:51	8	WHAT HAPPENED IS QUINN, EMANUEL FILED AN
17:51:53	9	ARBITRATION, YOUR HONOR, AND WE MOVED TO STAY THE
17:51:57	10	ARBITRATION.
17:51:58	11	IT WAS A MOTION. IT'S NOT A THERE
17:52:00	12	HASN'T BEEN A MALPRACTICE ACTION FILED AT THIS
17:52:03	13	TIME.
17:52:04	14	JUSTICE LOWE, WHO WE ARGUED THE MOTION IN
17:52:06	15	FRONT OF, WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT QUINN, EMANUEL'S
17:52:10	16	TACTICS IN THEIR RETAINER LETTER, WHICH SHORTENS
17:52:13	17	THE TIME LIMITATIONS, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
17:52:16	18	FOR THE CLIENT, BUT NOT FOR THEM. THEY HAVE A SIX
17:52:18	19	YEAR STATUTE.
17:52:19	20	IT SHORTENS THE ALREADY SHORT STATUTE OF
17:52:23	21	THREE YEARS AGAINST THE LAWYER TO ONE YEAR, AMONG
17:52:25	22	OTHER THINGS THAT ARE IN THEIR RETAINER LETTER.
17:52:27	23	JUSTICE LOWE HAS THAT NOW UNDER
17:52:30	24	ADVISEMENT AND HE'S SAID HE WILL BE QUICK WITH A
17:52:32	25	DECISION.

17:52:33	1	BUT THE STATEMENT IS INACCURATE TO SAY
17:52:35	2	THAT WE BROUGHT AN ACTION. WE DIDN'T FIRE THE
17:52:37	3	FIRST SHOT, JUDGE.
17:52:38	4	IT WAS QUINN, EMANUEL WHO DID IT.
17:52:40	5	WE FILED A MOTION TO STAY THE ARBITRATION
17:52:42	6	BECAUSE WE OFFERED QUINN, EMANUEL AND I HAVE
17:52:45	7	E-MAIL EXCHANGES TO SHOW THIS WE OFFERED QUINN,
17:52:48	8	EMANUEL A STANDSTILL IF THEY WOULD TOLL THE STATUTE
17:52:51	9	THAT'S CONTAINED IN THEIR RETAINER LETTER THAT
17:52:53	10	WOULD HAVE EXPIRED WHILE THIS APPEAL WAS PENDING.
17:52:55	11	WE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THAT.
17:52:57	12	THEY REFUSED TO DO THAT, AND THAT'S WHY
17:52:59	13	WE MOVED TO STAY THE ARBITRATION.
17:53:01	14	AS WE STAND HERE, JUDGE, THERE IS NO
17:53:04	15	MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST QUINN, EMANUEL.
17:53:06	16	MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR
17:53:07	17	THE COURT: AND THEN I WOULD WISH
17:53:09	18	CONNECTU TO CONFIRM TO ME THAT YOU HAVE FILED, AND
17:53:13	19	THERE IS CURRENTLY PENDING, A NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM
17:53:16	20	THE JUDGMENT.
17:53:16	21	MR. UNDERHILL: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR
17:53:18	22	HONOR.
17:53:18	23	AND OUR BRIEF, BY THE WAY, IS DUE IN THE
17:53:21	24	NINTH CIRCUIT, I THINK IT'S AUGUST 15. PLEASE
17:53:23	25	DON'T HOLD ME TO THAT, BUT IT'S SOMETHING LIKE

17:53:26	1	THAT.
17:53:27	2	AND, YOUR HONOR, MAYBE THIS IS A GOOD
17:53:29	3	TIME TO BRING UP THIS EXPEDITED APPEAL THING. I'LL
17:53:31	4	AGREE RIGHT NOW. WE'LL EXPEDITE IT. WE WILL
17:53:33	5	PURSUE IT LIKE CRAZY.
17:53:34	6	THE COURT: THAT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT
17:53:35	7	WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO DISCUSS HERE BECAUSE THAT'S
17:53:37	8	NOT SOMETHING THAT THIS COURT COULD ACCEPT OR
17:53:39	9	CONTROL OR DO ANYTHING ABOUT.
17:53:41	10	MR. UNDERHILL: BUT MR. CHATTERJEE COULD
17:53:43	11	IF HE WAS WILLING TO AGREE TO IT, AND HE DOESN'T.
17:53:45	12	THE COURT: BUT THIS IS THE IMPROPER
17:53:47	13	FORUM FOR THAT.
17:53:48	14	MR. UNDERHILL: OF COURSE, YOUR HONOR.
17:53:50	15	THE COURT: WELL, I'VE BENEFITED FROM THE
17:53:52	16	ARGUMENT.
17:53:53	17	I ALSO WANT TO KEEP TO THE TIME, SO I'M
17:53:55	18	GOING TO TAKE THIS MATTER UNDER SUBMISSION.
17:53:57	19	I'LL ASSURE BOTH SIDES, OR ALL THREE
17:54:01	20	SIDES I GUESS NOW, THAT I'LL MAKE A DECISION VERY
17:54:04	21	QUICKLY.
17:54:05	22	I'M NOT SURE I CAN GET IT OUT I'M IN
17:54:07	23	THE MIDDLE OF A CRIMINAL TRIAL AND THE JURY IS OUT,
17:54:10	24	SO THAT'LL OCCUPY ME A LITTLE BIT TOMORROW.
17:54:13	25	BUT I DO WANT TO BRING THIS TO A QUICK

17:54:16	1	DECISION SO THAT ANY ACTION THAT YOU WANT TO TAKE
17:54:18	2	CAN BE TAKEN.
17:54:19	3	I'VE BEEN TOLD OF ONE DEADLINE THAT HAS
17:54:21	4	PASSED. WHEN IS WHEN IS THE NEXT EVENT THAT
17:54:24	5	NEEDS TO TAKE PLACE WITH RESPECT TO THE ORDER THAT
17:54:28	6	I PUT IN PLACE AS TO THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TO
17:54:31	7	CARRY OUT THE JUDGMENT?
17:54:32	8	MR. CHATTERJEE: THAT WAS THE
17:54:33	9	MR. UNDERHILL: I THINK THAT FALLS IN
17:54:34	10	YOUR COURT, YOUR HONOR.
17:54:35	11	WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTIES' SUBMITTED
17:54:37	12	PROPOSED DRAFT RELEASES, I BELIEVE THE COURT'S
17:54:40	13	ORDER SAYS THAT THE COURT WILL THEN TAKE THOSE AND,
17:54:44	14	YOU KNOW, SUBMIT WHAT IS TO BE THE WHAT IS
17:54:46	15	SUPPOSED TO BE THE FINAL RELEASE.
17:54:47	16	THE COURT: OKAY. AND THEN THERE WAS
17:54:49	17	SOME MENTION OF A DEFAULT WITH SOMEBODY TO THE
17:54:52	18	SUBMISSION OF STOCK.
17:54:53	19	MR. CHATTERJEE: YES, YOUR HONOR.
17:54:54	20	THERE WERE TWO THINGS THAT WERE DUE ON
17:54:56	21	MONDAY FROM BOTH SETS OF PARTIES. ONE OF THEM WERE
17:54:59	22	THE DISMISSALS OF THE CASES, AS OPPOSED TO THE
17:55:02	23	RELEASES.
17:55:03	24	AND IN OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. FISHER,
17:55:06	25	WE AT LEAST MR. FISHER AND I, I DON'T THINK

17:55:08	1	MR. UNDERHILL WAS ON THE PHONE DECIDED THAT HE
17:55:11	2	SHOULD BE THE CUSTODIAN OF THEM, RATHER THAN JUST
17:55:13	3	FILING THEM. THE ORDER WASN'T ENTIRELY CLEAR ON
17:55:16	4	THAT POINT.
17:55:16	5	AND THE SECOND WAS THE CONNECTU STOCK WAS
17:55:18	6	SUPPOSED TO BE IN HIS HANDS.
17:55:20	7	WE SUBMITTED EVERYTHING OF THOSE TWO
17:55:22	8	PIECES THAT WERE LEFT.
17:55:24	9	SO FAR CONNECTU AND THE INDIVIDUALS HAVE
17:55:27	10	SUBMITTED NOTHING.
17:55:28	11	MR. UNDERHILL: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR
17:55:29	12	HONOR.
17:55:30	13	AND IF I MAY SPECIFICALLY SAY SOMETHING
17:55:32	14	ABOUT THE DISMISSALS, PLEASE?
17:55:33	15	THE DISMISSALS ARE FOR TWO ACTIONS.
17:55:36	16	WE'RE ON THE OFFENSE IN MASSACHUSETTS. THAT'S THE
17:55:40	17	MAIN CLAIM. THAT'S THE ONE THAT LED TO THE
17:55:42	18	SETTLEMENT.
17:55:42	19	WE'RE ON THE DEFENSE IN CALIFORNIA.
17:55:45	20	THE COURT'S ORDER HAD TO DO WITH
17:55:49	21	DISMISSALS IN BOTH ACTIONS, AND AGAIN, ALTHOUGH
17:55:50	22	MUCH OF OUR DISCUSSION HERE TODAY IS FOCUSSED ON
17:55:53	23	THE STOCK BEING TRANSFERRED, THERE ARE INCREDIBLY
17:55:56	24	SERIOUS APPELLATE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE
17:55:59	25	DISMISSALS AS WELL.

17:56:00 1 17:56:03 2 3 17:56:08 17:56:11 4 17:56:14 5 17:56:18 6 17:56:19 7 17:56:20 8 17:56:23 9 17:56:26 10 17:56:28 11 17:56:31 12 17:56:33 13 17:56:34 14 17:56:38 15 17:56:40 16 17:56:43 17 17:56:46 18 17:56:49 19 17:56:53 20 17:56:54 21 17:56:58 22 17:57:01 23 17:57:04 24

17:57:06 25

SPECIFICALLY, IF WE VOLUNTARILY GO TO

MASSACHUSETTS OR VOLUNTARILY GO WITH A GUN AT OUR

HEAD FROM AN ORDER FROM A CALIFORNIA COURT AND FILE

A STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL, AT LEAST SO FAR, YOUR

HONOR, I DON'T SEE HOW WE CAN THEN RESURRECT THAT

CASE.

AND I'M NOT CERTAIN OF THIS, AND MAYBE
THERE'S A LEGAL WAY TO DO IT, IF WE GO UP TO THE
NINTH CIRCUIT, ARE SUCCESSFUL, WE COME BACK DOWN,
THE QUESTION THEN BECOMES, YOU KNOW, WHAT HAPPENS
TO OUR OFFENSIVE CLAIMS IF INDEED WE HAVE DISMISSED
IN MASSACHUSETTS?

THE COURT: WELL, I UNDERSTAND THAT.

THAT'S WHY I INCLUDED IN MY JUDGMENT CERTAIN STEPS

WHERE YOU'D HAVE TO COME BACK TO THE COURT AND THAT

WOULD GIVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER I

SHOULD ORDER THE PARTIES TO TAKE ANOTHER STEP.

OF COURSE, THAT IS ALL SUBJECT TO VARIOUS APPEALS OR REQUESTS FOR WRITS DIRECTED TOWARD MY CONDUCT.

YOU'RE DOING A GOOD JOB OF ANSWERING MY OUESTIONS. THIS IS GOING A LITTLE BIT BEYOND IT.

SO I JUST -- IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT WHAT I NEED TO DO NOW IS DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO GRANT THE MOTION TO STAY AND TO GRANT THIS INTERVENTION.

17:57:09	1	TO THE EXTENT THERE HAS BEEN A DEFAULT,
17:57:12	2	WHEN IT CAME TO MY ATTENTION, I ASSUMED THAT IT WAS
17:57:16	3	IN VIEW OF THESE MOTIONS AND THAT THERE IS NO
17:57:20	4	CONTEMPT OF THE COURT, IT WAS SIMPLY JUST AN EFFORT
17:57:22	5	ON THE PART OF THE PARTIES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
17:57:25	6	HAVING THE COURT HEAR THESE MATTERS BEFORE TAKING
17:57:28	7	ANOTHER STEP, THINKING THAT IT WOULD BE THAT
17:57:31	8	THEY MIGHT WIN AND, THEREFORE, NOT BE NECESSARY TO
17:57:35	9	TAKE THE STEP.
17:57:36	10	BUT I'LL TAKE THAT INTO CONSIDERATION IN
17:57:39	11	MAKING MY RULING HERE.
17:57:40	12	MR. CHATTERJEE: YOUR HONOR,
17:57:42	13	RESPECTFULLY, I DISAGREE ON THAT ONE.
17:57:43	14	WE PUT OUR WE PUT A HUGE AMOUNT OF
17:57:46	15	CONSIDERATION INTO MR. FISHER'S HANDS ON MONDAY.
17:57:48	16	THE COURT: YES.
17:57:50	17	MR. CHATTERJEE: AND THEY'VE PUT NOTHING.
17:57:51	18	AND THIS ORDER SPECIFICALLY SAID UNLESS
17:57:52	19	OTHERWISE ORDERED BY THE COURT, THEY HAD TO DO IT
17:57:56	20	ON MONDAY.
17:57:56	21	THE COURT: YES.
17:57:56	22	MR. CHATTERJEE: THEY DIDN'T EVEN FILE
17:57:58	23	THE COURT: YES, I UNDERSTAND.
17:57:59	24	IF THERE IF YOU WANT TO, IN DUE
17:58:00	25	COURSE, BRING SOME MATTER BEFORE THE COURT ASKING

17:58:03 1	ME TO HOLD THEM IN CONTEMPT OF THAT, YOU CAN.
17:58:04 2	BUT I THINK THAT I CAN HANDLE JUST THE,
17:58:07 3	THE DEFAULT BETWEEN WHATEVER PERIOD OF TIME THAT
17:58:10 4	I THINK WE'RE TALKING A MATTER OF DAYS, THEN.
17:58:12 5	MR. CHATTERJEE: A MATTER OF DAYS.
17:58:13 6	THE COURT: I CAN HANDLE THAT IN SAYING
17:58:15 7	"YOU'RE EXCUSED" OR "YOU'RE ORDERED TO DO IT" AND
17:58:17 8	GIVE ANOTHER DEADLINE THAT WOULD BE REASONABLE
17:58:18 9	UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
17:58:21 10	BUT I'LL TAKE THE MATTER UNDER
17:58:23 11	SUBMISSION.
17:58:23 12	THANK YOU ALL.
17:58:25 13	MR. O'SHEA: AND, YOUR HONOR, JUST ONE
17:58:26 14	WE WILL NEED PROBABLY THE 30 DAYS UNDER RULE 4 FOR
17:58:30 15	GOOD CAUSE SHOWN WHILE THE MATTER IS SUB JUDICE FOR
17:58:33 16	OUR MOTION TO INTERVENE.
17:58:35 17	I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG IT'LL TAKE THE
17:58:36 18	COURT TO ACT ON THAT, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO ALERT THE
17:58:38 19	COURT THAT
17:58:39 20	THE COURT: YOU NEED 30 DAYS FOR WHAT?
17:58:41 21	MR. O'SHEA: 30 DAYS TO FILE OUR APPEAL,
17:58:43 22	BECAUSE WE HAVEN'T FILED OUR APPEAL YET BECAUSE THE
17:58:45 23	INTERVENTION HADN'T BEEN GRANTED.
17:58:47 24	THE COURT: I'M NOT SURE I CONTROL THAT.
17:58:49 25	BUT TO THE EXTENT I CONTROL IT, I THOUGHT

17:58:51 1	YOU SAID 14 DAYS EARLIER. I HEAR YOU NOW TO SAY 30
17:58:56 2	DAYS.
17:58:56 3	MR. O'SHEA: I GUESS I THOUGHT I WAS
17:58:58 4	GOING TO GET A DECISION TODAY, JUDGE, AND I GUESS I
17:59:00 5	PERHAPS WAS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC.
17:59:03 6	THE COURT: THANK YOU.
17:59:03 7	MR. CHATTERJEE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
17:59:04 8	MR. UNDERHILL: THANK YOU.
17:59:04 9	(WHEREUPON, THE EVENING RECESS WAS
17:59:04 10	TAKEN.)
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